Listen to the article
Similar to an eternal curse, Lebanon keeps on bearing the price of its very existence on the frontlines of historical and geographical fault lines in the region.
Had the regional leaders at the 1919 Peace Conference foreseen how the region would evolve over the years, they might have delineated Lebanon’s borders differently or aspired for its neutrality, although such options were neither feasible nor realistic. The cultural diversity and the various Lebanese affiliations that led each community to seek external protection for its existence and identity within Lebanon have tied the country’s fate to many conflicts, starting with the wave of coups in the Arab region that coincided with its independence.
Following the change in Lebanon’s ruling regime marked by Bechara el-Khoury’s peaceful removal from power, the winds of change came alongside the developments occurring in Syria. The initial indicator of the external tensions that would engulf Lebanon was the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, with Lebanon situated on the frontline of the newly formed State’s northern border. Amidst the waves of the Arab opposition revolution, which strongly advocated for unity, and the ascent of the Free Officers to heroic status in Egypt’s leadership, Gamal Abdel Nasser exerted a significant influence over Lebanon’s political landscape. His call for Arab unity and the ongoing resistance against Israel found resonance within Lebanon despite geographical obstacles in the Arab Republic eventually leading Lebanon closer to Syria.
While Camille Chamoun failed to mend the schism within Lebanon, as Abdel Nasser had inflamed the sentiments of Muslims and Chamoun further exacerbated tensions by joining the Baghdad Pact and seeking assistance from US President Dwight Eisenhower to counter the Soviet threat to Lebanon, Fouad Chehab understood how to establish the Country of the Cedars’ distinctive neutrality in the country’s modern history. He entrenched this neutrality by reaching an agreement with Abdel Nasser along the Lebanese-Syrian border, vowing not to align with external factions. In return, this accord aimed to preserve stability within Lebanon.
However, despite emulating Chehab’s approach, Charles Helou fell short of replicating the same success. He was impeded by the headwinds of Arab setbacks, and the events of 1967 reshaped his role from that of a president to a firefighter, battling fires that erupted everywhere. Consequently, the 1969 Cairo Agreement became the sole viable option for the Lebanese to evade an unavoidable war.
Before that, Lebanon had borne the cost in Israeli operations, including the notable one at Beirut Airport in 1968. Lebanon was officially drawn into the fedayeen conflict, which replaced Abdel Nasser’s influence with Abu Ammar’s keffiyeh. The partial restoration of Arab dignity in 1973 further entangled Lebanon in the grip of the fedayeen, making it increasingly challenging to counter the ongoing liberation movement on Lebanese soil.
With Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power in Syria and the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War, he assumed the role of a caring father figure. He did so on the premise that Lebanon was a Syrian protectorate, and his intervention in that country was framed as a move to protect the Christian minorities. Assad was seen as another minority leader who recognized the profound existential concerns in the region. However, he saw in the Camp David Accords of 1978 an opportunity to play a role similar to Abdel Nasser’s, especially after Egypt withdrew from its conflict with Israel and shifted its stance on the Lebanese front. Once again, Lebanon paid the price.
The list of conflicts that Lebanon had endured was extensive, and Bashir Gemayel believed he could bring about a decisive battle by expelling the Palestinian Liberation Organization from Lebanon. However, he didn’t come to power to rebuild what had shattered.
Amidst the rise of the Islamic Republic, which replaced the Shah’s regime in Iran under the guidance of the Supreme Leader, the Shiite community in Lebanon became part of a broader project, except for those who tried to oppose it, with little success.
After the war, Rafic Hariri — like many others in the Arab world — believed that peace was within reach and that both reconstruction and stability would benefit from this development. However, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin abruptly shattered peace prospects. In Lebanon, this translated into a tangled web of frustrations, spanning from the ongoing Israeli occupation to the eventual liberation in 2000, many years after UN Resolution 425.
However, liberation alone proved inadequate to quell the conflicts. Hezbollah’s agenda remained cloaked under the Shebaa Farms issue, while the wider Middle East peace initiative continued to thread through Arab summits in Beirut, presenting a progressive and hopeful facade and cementing Lebanon’s pivotal role in the process. Nevertheless, the crucial difference between Lebanon and other countries over the years is that Lebanon has remained the sole bordering State — yes, the only one, even with Syria also sharing a border with Israel — that has grappled with the ongoing struggles on behalf of all Arab nations. The Syrians capitalized on this, using Lebanese territory to confront Israeli incursions, ensuring that the Golan Heights remains a perennial bargaining chip.
Lebanon may have reaped certain benefits from various Arab crises, including the invasion of Iraq and the influx of funds into its territory. However, it also bore the cost of exerting pressure on the Arab Ba’athist regime and the subsequent withdrawal of the Syrian army, which was replaced by Hezbollah within the government and the State’s framework. Nature hates a vacuum, and so do Constitutions.
Today, Hezbollah’s involvement in governments legitimizes its intervention in Syria, Kuwait and Bahrain under the premise that “it is your brother, not your hero, who compels you.” The Baabda Declaration has been reduced to a mere picture adorning the walls of Baabda’s presidential Palace, symbolizing the inability to reach an accord amidst the regional conflicts.
This encapsulates Lebanon’s condition across various stages and crises. What is happening today in Gaza could potentially trigger a wider wave of Arab normalization, and Lebanon stands poised to bear the consequences and ramifications, whether normalization materializes or not.
Nonetheless, the looming apprehension consistently revolves around the potential for a major war. There will come a time when the need to disengage Hezbollah from regional roles becomes undeniable. Given the innate aversion to power vacuums, the question arises as to what viable alternatives could emerge in that critical scenario.
