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One cannot challenge the notion that a century ago, the aspiration for a Greater Lebanon primarily stemmed from the Christian community and lacked a genuine endorsement from Muslims regarding the current borders. Back then, Muslims were more inclined towards unification with Syria, while Patriarch Elias Howayek advocated for the establishment of Lebanon’s present boundaries, encompassing the Beqaa Valley. This decision was motivated by concerns over a potential second famine akin to the one endured by the residents of Mount Lebanon during World War I.
The famous following quote is attributed to the French High Commissioner of the Levant at the time, General Henri Gouraud, who addressed it to the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Elias Howayek, “You were significant in Little Lebanon, and you will become insignificant in Greater Lebanon.”
The demographic concerns, to which the Patriarch didn’t attach much importance at the time, were at the forefront of the French High Commissioner’s mind. It included the annexation of the Sunni-majority coastal cities, the Beqaa Valley, and the predominantly Shiite South to the Maronite and Druze Mount Lebanon’s mutasarrifia or administration. In the Middle East, demographics tend to shape maps over time, as seen by most historical experiences that rely primarily on sectarianism.
A century later, following the failure of both the first and second Republics, Christians are confronted with numerous options, all of which share the common belief that within the framework of Greater Lebanon, their presence is at risk.
The fear of the Christian population is fueled by demographic shifts that have altered the equation: from a Christian presence constituting 55% of the population in the last census conducted in 1932, to 33% according to voter registration lists for the 2022 elections, bearing in mind that these lists do not include individuals below the age of 21.
More prominently, concerns came to the forefront following a statement made by Prime Minister Najib Mikati saying that, according to a study, the Christian population in Lebanon currently represents 19% of the total population.
Despite all efforts to refute the study and reaffirm the numbers attributed to voter registration lists, and despite Islamic figures’ speeches regarding the “advantages” of the Christian presence in Lebanon, the Christians’ stance has hardened. Their position reflects their apprehension about their demographic future in Lebanon.
Regardless of the proposed suggestions and various terms used, be it expanded decentralization, federalism, or partition, the problem lies elsewhere. Hezbollah’s ideology precedes all proposals and ideas, as the Shiite party has managed to undermine all these ideas through its “civilian” presence.
Hezbollah’s current interest lies in maintaining the status quo in Lebanon. Once the timing of a major settlement arises, the pro-Iranian faction will likely seek constitutional assurances and an increased role within the State in exchange for disarming, citing their demographic majority among Lebanon’s other constituents as a key argument.
Unlike the theory “we have stopped counting” adopted by the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and later by his son Saad, Hezbollah has never eased its concerns about demographics. In fact, ever since 2005, it has gone as far as distinguishing between parliamentary and demographic majorities.
In addition, Hezbollah has strategically expanded its presence over the years in various areas. The Shiite presence has extended into the central part of Jbeil, thereby establishing a significant Shiite presence in the northern section of Mount Lebanon, a weighing factor in any electoral or non-electoral divisions within the Jbeil district. Which brings us to the controversy that arose regarding the expansion and land acquisitions in the Keserwan mountains by individuals close to the Shiite party. While at the time, Hezbollah’s allies downplayed the significance of the issue, its opponents feared that Hezbollah was delineating a line connecting Mount Lebanon to the party’s stronghold in the Beqaa Valley.
As for the southern part of Mount Lebanon, the party extended its influence along the southern coastline of the city of Beirut in the district of Baabda, forming what is currently known as the “Southern Suburbs,” Hezbollah’s main stronghold. Despite the statements that escalated after the 2006 July War, calling for efforts to reclaim Christian awkaf or endowment lands in the region, which historically held a Christian majority from Haret Hreik all the way to Mrayjeh, tangible resolutions have remained elusive.
In the Beqaa Valley, a telling example of the present demographic landscape can be seen in the town of Mashghara. The demographic makeup of this town has undergone a shift, with Shiite Muslims currently constituting the majority, marking a notable departure from the substantial Christian presence that once characterized the area.
As for Zahleh (the capital of the Beqaa Governorate), the Shiite presence has created a ring around the city in many villages and towns, and the Shiite population in the district as a whole currently exceeds twenty thousand residents. The issue of Hezbollah’s upkeep of its communication network in the region that occurred years ago is a clear indicator of this expansion.
The latter point helps clarify Hezbollah’s current focus on the northern front. Reports indicate that the party’s influence is expanding, especially in Akkar, where it has been providing social services and engaging in extensive activities in the villages close to the borders. Without making assumptions about intentions, it is worth noting that experience suggests that any move made by the party should not be viewed as anodyne. With these recent steps that have extended to the district of Jezzine and its alleged airport, the territorial scope of “Bsharri Jezzine” – as delineated by the extremist Christian faction in favor of a Christian State – is dwindling. This purported State has become increasingly vulnerable across numerous locations due to Hezbollah’s strategic gains. The Shiite party refused to support the Elyssar project alongside the Linord project in the Metn region as it strongly opposes the demolition of homes in Ouzai and the displacement of its residents. It unequivocally rejects any proposed map adjustments, as its influence now extends to every region.
In this part of the world, the Christians’ historical and geographical concerns are palpable. Today, Christians need to grasp that Hezbollah’s agenda does not alleviate these concerns. In fact, it triggers apprehensions among Muslims as well. There’s a prevailing sense that Hezbollah’s acceptance of the centralized State is motivated primarily by its desire to bolster its presence and influence.
