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3. Saudi Arabia’s Shadow Over Lebanon's Path to Peace

As Lebanon prepares for new rounds of security and political talks with Israel in Washington in the coming two weeks, Saudi Arabia’s position on peace with Jerusalem looms over decision makers in Beirut.

In a May 10 interview with Al-Arabiya, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said that Lebanon is open to peace with Israel within the framework of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, a Saudi-backed proposal that links normalization to a comprehensive regional settlement and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Days earlier, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea suggested in an interview that Lebanon’s “ideal scenario” would be to coordinate with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states on a timeline for peace with Israel.

These positions highlight an emerging debate within Lebanon over whether the country should continue to anchor its stance within the Arab Peace Initiative or instead align itself with the U.S.-backed Abraham Accords based on bilateral normalization with Israel. This Is Beirut spoke with experts on the history of Saudi Arabia’s influence in Lebanon, its shifting regional position, and Riyadh’s stance on the Beirut-Jerusalem talks.

From Patronage to Absence

So far in 2026, Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian aid to Lebanon has totaled just $1.3 million, accounting for less than one percent of foreign support for the conflict-stricken country. This paltry support highlights how far Riyadh’s financial support for Lebanon has dwindled, even as it still aims to influence politics in the country.

Lebanese officials should not count too heavily on the prospect of Saudi financial support, according to Hagar Chemali, former director for Syria and Lebanon in the U.S. National Security Council.

“Waiting on Saudi money is not smart,” she said, noting that reconstruction and aid commitments have historically been delayed or revised.

Saudi Arabia became a major force in Lebanon’s post-1975–1990 Civil War revival, exerting influence through state institutions and late political heavyweight Rafik Hariri to support reconstruction efforts. Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, Riyadh pledged $500 million in reconstruction aid and deposited $1 billion at Banque du Liban to stabilize the Lebanese pound and reinforce confidence in the banking sector.

Yet, Saudi Arabia’s significant institutional support for Lebanon began to wane after Hezbollah’s takeover of western Beirut in May 2008 and the subsequent Doha Agreement, which cemented the militia’s political veto power within the country. Riyadh shifted from backing state institutions to engaging political figures in the pro-Western March 14 alliance, including Future Movement leader Saad Hariri, son of the assassinated former prime minister.

Saudi Arabia became the March 14 alliance’s principal regional patron, positioning it as a counterweight to Hezbollah and Iran’s expanding influence in Lebanon. However, political divisions became blurred in Lebanon, with a national unity government coming to power under Hariri and newly-elected President Michel Aoun in 2016.

In a sign of Riyadh’s withdrawal, it suspended in 2016 a $3 billion aid package for the Lebanese Armed Forces amid Hezbollah’s growing power in Lebanon and its expanding regional role, including its support for Saudi Arabia’s foes, the Houthis in Yemen. Since then, Saudi support for Beirut has dwindled further even as Lebanon has faced compounding economic and security crises.

At the same time, the U.S. diplomatic role and financial support in Lebanon has grown, with Washington becoming the largest contributor to the LAF, providing more than $3 billion in assistance since 2006 through training, salaries, and equipment. Unlike Saudi assistance, which has been episodic and politically conditional, US support has remained continuous and institutionally centered, reinforcing a structural rather than political form of engagement.

Saudi Arabia’s Calculus

As the U.S. mediates Lebanon-Israel talks aimed at broader security and political agreements, Saudi Arabia has sought to harden Beirut’s stance against potential normalization with Jerusalem.

“The Saudis don’t want Lebanon to go out ahead of them,” Chemali said. Saudi officials are privately discouraging Lebanese leaders from moving too quickly on talks with Israel, she added, while simultaneously denying to the U.S. that they are exerting such pressure.

Instead, she argued, Saudi policy seeks to keep Lebanon’s diplomacy within a broader regional framework along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative, which she described as a “stalling tactic” aimed at constraining the Beirut–Jerusalem talks.

This reflects Riyadh’s shifting diplomatic approach amid the upheaval following the October 7, 2023 attacks and ensuing regional conflict. Riyadh has rebuffed the Trump administration’s efforts to join the Abraham Accords, instead maintaining a more cautious approach anchored in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Adopted at an Arab League summit in Beirut, the initiative calls for collective Arab normalization with Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state. It stands in stark contrast to the U.S.-initiated Abraham Accords that are based on bilateral normalization with the Jewish state.

Just as the UAE, a signatory of the Abraham Accords, has moved closer to Israel, Saudi Arabia has aligned with Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar, and Egypt in an emerging bloc opposing normalization. All the while, a deepening rift has developed between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, once close allies.

Riyadh sees itself as the region’s dominant power and is reluctant to allow smaller states to advance initiatives that could undermine its leverage in any future move toward normalization with Israel, according to Chemali.

Marwan El Amine, a Lebanese political analyst, said some political figures in Lebanon are insisting on linking Beirut’s position on normalization with Israel to Saudi Arabia’s stance. This, he said, was not necessarily because of strategic necessity, but because of shifting political alignments and domestic calculations.

Political actors previously aligned with Hezbollah are now attempting to reposition themselves with the Saudi-led regional camp, Amine said. Meanwhile, other figures view aligning with Riyadh as politically or financially advantageous, he added.

Lebanese Christian Parties Push Back

Leading Lebanese Christian parties have denied that Saudi Arabia is obstructing talks between Beirut and Jerusalem. Lebanese Forces official Joseph Gebeily said allegations that Riyadh is instructing Lebanese leaders to slow negotiations or reduce their scope are “pure fabrication.”

“The Saudi position, as far as I understand it, is much more straightforward,” he said, adding that Riyadh has emphasized that Lebanon should act according to its national interests rather than following foreign agendas.

Gebeily said that Geagea’s statements in support of Lebanon coordinating with Arab states on diplomacy have been selectively interpreted for political reasons.

“He consistently maintained that negotiations should move forward,” Gebeily said. “His position remains in favor of advancing the Lebanese-Israeli track rather than postponing it.”

Kataeb Party head of foreign affairs Marwan Abdallah said that Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, broadly support the negotiation path being pursued by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.

“If Lebanon’s interest is through a broader Arab initiative, we’ll support it,” he said. “If Lebanon’s interest is to sign before Saudi Arabia and all Arab countries, then we’ll support that too.”

Toward an Agreement

Lebanon is preparing to continue the U.S.-mediated talks with Israel on parallel tracks, with a military delegation set to meet at the Pentagon on May 29 for security discussions, while political talks are expected to resume in early June. Stakeholders are converging on an agreement, according to Chemali.

Unlike traditional peace processes in which mediators must pressure reluctant parties, she added, the current talks are marked by a rare alignment of incentives, even if disagreements persist over sequencing, guarantees, and implementation of a potential deal.

The current negotiations are focused less on territorial questions than on security arrangements, disarmament mechanisms, and preventing future escalations along the Lebanese-Israeli frontier, she said.

Chemali said that such broader settlements would serve Lebanon’s sovereignty and long-term stability. Delaying negotiations in deference to external regional calculations risks perpetuating Hezbollah’s role and prolonging Lebanon’s crisis, she added.

For Amine, security arrangements alone are insufficient. While temporary understandings may reduce immediate tensions, he argued they would not eliminate the structural conditions that have destabilized the country.

As long as Lebanon formally remains in a state of war with Israel, the country will continue to serve as an open arena for regional confrontations involving Hezbollah, Palestinian factions, Hamas, and other armed groups, he said.

“The southern front can be reopened at any moment,” Amine said, “because the state of hostility itself becomes the political and legal justification for renewed escalation.”

“The only way to truly protect Lebanon is through a full peace agreement,” he said.