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3. Iran at the Edge: Uprising, Exhaustion, and the Fate of the Islamic Republic

Amid growing protests, Iran’s rulers face one of their most dangerous moments since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, with the pillars that have long sustained the regime now visibly cracking. Protests that erupted in late December 2025 over imploded living conditions have evolved into a nationwide revolt against the ruling system itself, fueled by economic collapse and mounting public humiliation.

While the Islamic Republic has weathered episodic outbursts of street anger over the years, it is now undergoing a stress test on its capacity to function. The freefall of Iran’s rial national currency and soaring inflation—including sharp food price hikes—pushed millions beyond their capacity to cope and triggered demonstrations. In Iran, inflation is more than an abstract statistic; it determines whether families can afford to buy meat for dinner, heat their homes or keep enrolling their children in school. 

This new wave of protests differs from earlier unrest in one critical respect: it has been initiated by merchants, bazaar traders, truck drivers, and public-sector workers. The closure of bazaars signaled a rupture in the informal social contract between state and society that has historically protected the clerical regime. While the authorities have proven adept at repressing students and activists, replacing markets is far more difficult.

Within days, protests spread to over one-hundred cities across more than twenty provinces, crossing ethnic, sectarian, and class lines. The slogans shifted quickly, as chants over economic conditions gave way to explicit calls against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and for the end of the regime, invoking pre–Islamic Revolution symbolism, including references to Reza Pahlavi.

The state responded as it always has, with force. The police, Basij, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps used live ammunition, mass arrests, and intimidation tactics, including hospital raids and night detentions. Internet disruptions and school closures followed—officially blamed on weather or technical issues—but widely understood as crowd-control tools.

Yet rather than restoring control, repression has only slowed the momentum of protests. More worrying for Tehran are early signs, still limited but symbolically significant, of fraying discipline at the edges of its security forces. Reports of local police or Basij units refusing orders or briefly siding with protesters, while not widespread, evoke dangerous historical parallels for the regime. The Islamic Republic was born when the Shah’s security forces hesitated, a lesson internalized by Iran’s current leaders.  

At the political level, President Masoud Pezeshkian has attempted to play the role of mediator, calling for dialogue and acknowledging “legitimate demands,” even as the judiciary promises zero tolerance. This split messaging reflects a deeper truth: the regime is unsure whether it is managing a crisis or entering a terminal phase.

Externally, rhetoric from Donald Trump warning that the United States is prepared to intervene if protesters are massacred has energized some demonstrators, while also reinforcing the regime’s favorite narrative: foreign conspiracy. Historically, foreign threats help Tehran consolidate hard-line control, marginalize moderates, and justify extreme repression.

Direct military intervention is unlikely and, paradoxically, would probably prolong the regime’s life rather than shorten it. Iran’s crisis is internal, structural, and economic, with no foreign army able to resolve it.  

The Islamic Republic has survived crises before in 2009, 2019, and 2022, each time relying on the pillars of petroleum revenues, coercive unity, and public exhaustion. Today, all three of these are eroding. Ideological regimes such as Iran’s can survive dissent, but are rarely able to weather prolonged inability to provide basic stability for their people. 

However, a sudden collapse of the Islamic Republic remains unlikely in the immediate term.  The security apparatus is still largely intact, and no senior military split has emerged. The most probable near-term outcome is a brutal reassertion of control combined with limited economic concessions, enough to buy time but not solve structural problems.

The more dangerous scenario is prolonged unrest characterized by local uprisings and the gradual erosion of state capacity. Such a slow-burn crisis risks kicking off domestic power struggles or a chaotic leadership transition. While a civil war is not on the cards in the near term, the longer instability persists, the less unthinkable it becomes. 

The Islamic Republic will likely survive this round of unrest, but that should not be confused with strength. Iran is entering a phase where each successive crisis leaves the state weaker than before, more reliant on coercion, and less capable of recovery. The regime may endure for years, but it will do so hollowed out, brittle, and increasingly vulnerable to shocks it can no longer absorb.