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3. Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood: Rivalry, Similarities, and Tactical Convergences

The relationship between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood illustrates the paradoxes of political Islam in the Middle East. Temporary alliances, strategic interests, and deep sectarian divides intersect—from the war in Syria to Palestinian factions—producing a shifting balance between cooperation and antagonism.

On June 19, 2025, amid the Iran-Israel war, Dr. Salah Abdel Haq, acting head of the Brotherhood, expressed his “full solidarity” with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in an official message addressed to Tehran. “This conflict is not an isolated battle for Iran, but a new chapter in the targeting of the regional resistance movement,” he stated, before calling to “overcome sectarian and historical differences in order to face the common enemy.”

This statement highlights a recurring pattern: despite longstanding theological and political divergences, tactical alignments between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood emerge when confronting shared adversaries.

From Mistrust to Convergence

The divide between Shiites and Sunnis runs deep and have long shaped the political and geopolitical landscape of the Muslim world.

 “Mistrust, if not outright suspicion, persists between the Sunni and Shia branches, for historical reasons dating back to the earliest days of Islam and the fitna (conflict, schism) that divided Muslims over the central question of who was most entitled to succeed the Prophet, specifically whether it should be someone from his lineage or not,” notes David Rigoulet-Roze, researcher at the French Institute for Strategic Analysis (IFAS).

Yet when we examine the revolutionary political-religious dynamics of Iran alongside those of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), more commonly known simply as the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), a transnational Sunni Islamic organization founded in 1928 in Ismailia by Hassan al-Banna, we find striking parallels. The Brotherhood’s declared goal, the Islamic renaissance (nahda), promotes a political Islam that sees ‘Islam as the solution’ and resists ‘Western secular influence’.

This centuries-old mistrust do not preclude certain tactical convergences. In this respect, the 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a turning point: for the first time, a modern state adopted a system based on Twelver Shiism. This system known as  Velayat-e Faqih theorized by Ayatollah Ruhollah Moussavi Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, under which an experienced jurist-theologian holds supreme political and religious authority, governing the state to ensure society’s conformity with Islamic law and the public interest. 

“In reality, it is important to distinguish the traditional stance of the Shia clergy, who are reluctant to engage in political affairs, from the paradoxical and unprecedented position that gave rise to the quasi-heterodox principle of Velayat-e Faqih (‘jurisprudence of the jurisprudent,’ meaning the primacy of the religious over the political) during Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 revolution,” explains Rigoulet-Roze. “The Shia dynamic of seizing power during the 1979 Islamic Revolution can be compared to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which potentially explains certain alignments that are not purely accidental.”

Similarities Between Shia and Brotherhood Revolutionaries

The Muslim Brotherhood advocates societal reform through Islam, adopting a gradualist approach aimed at establishing an Islamic state by peaceful—often electoral—means. Its understanding of sharia differs markedly from that of Iran, and its commitment to the Sunni umma places it at odds with Iran’s Shia ambition to export its revolution. Yet Shia and Brotherhood revolutionaries converge on a core principle: “Islam is the solution,” as the researcher emphasizes.

While these were the Brotherhood’s founding objectives, “the struggle against the State of Israel would become central to the movement, legitimizing jihad,” Rigoulet-Roze continues. The radicalization of certain branches, particularly Qutbism—inspired by Sayyid Qutb, advocating armed struggle, the establishment of a strict Islamic state, and the purification of society according to sharia—thus reveals clear parallels with revolutionary Shia movements.

“The theorist of armed jihad is Sayyid Qutb, who was sentenced to death and hanged on August 26, 1966, by Gamal Abdel Nasser,” notes Rigoulet-Roze. “He would later be explicitly and repeatedly cited by Khomeini by name in many of his speeches.”

“So, there is a kind of permeability, at least intellectually, beyond the sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites,” the researcher summarizes. “And the similarities do not stop there, because when we look specifically at the Velayat, the Islamic Republic is dominated by the figure of a ‘Supreme Leader’ (Rahbar-e Enqelāb in Persian),” he notes. In the Brotherhood, “there is also a theory of ‘guidance’ with the Murshid, equivalent to the Rahbar, all else being equal.” 
In short, despite their differences, revolutionary Shiites and the Muslim Brotherhood share a vision of religious leadership, a politicized Islam, and militant tactics, creating occasional points of convergence beyond the longstanding Sunni-Shia opposition.

Between Pragmatic Alliances…

Recent history reveals several tactical convergences. In the 1980s, Tehran supported certain Sunni Islamist branches opposed to hostile regimes, such as in Egypt and Sudan. The most emblematic case remains Hamas, backed by Iran since the 1990s, not due to doctrinal proximity but because of the shared commitment to the struggle against Israel.

According to Rigoulet-Roze, “It is out of opportunism and well-understood geopolitical interests, given that Hamas is not the Tehran’s most important partner—due to obvious sectarian difference—especially when compared to Hezbollah or other proxies in Syria, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, the Houthis. The latter, belonging to Zaydism, a branch distinct from Iran’s Twelver Shiism, follow a different conception of Shiism. Yet Hamas ‘is not entirely an anomaly,’ he points out, emphasizing that it is ‘a movement directly on Israel’s doorstep, and even inside the occupied territories. So, of course, it could only be an objective ally of Tehran.”

The outbreak of the Arab revolutions, however, introduced new complexities. Initially, Mohammed Morsi’s rise to power in Egypt sparked cautious hope in Tehran. His visit to the Iranian capital in August 2012 was symbolically significant. Yet once there, he quickly criticized the regime of Bashar al-Assad, an ally of the Iranian mullahs, while taking the side of the Syrian revolutionaries.

…And Grassroots Oppositions

The situation in Syria adds further complexities to the Iran-Hamas relationship. In 2012, Hamas chose to side with the Sunni insurgents due to sectarian affinities, explains Rigoulet-Roze, who also highlights internal tensions within the movement. “There were two factions within Hamas: a pro-Iranian tendency, represented notably by Yahya Sinwar in Gaza, and a more anti-Iranian wing, embodied by Khaled Mechaal abroad.”

Beyond the Palestinian Islamist movement, the Syrian conflict became a proxy battleground. Tehran supported Bashar al-Assad, while several groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood took up arms against the regime. “There is a clarification that is effectively sectarian,” notes Rigoulet-Roze, recalling that since the fall of the former dictator, “the new power emerging from the Sunni insurgents of HTS is openly anti-Iranian,” with the new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, determined “to prevent Syria from continuing to serve as the Iranian hub to Lebanon, as was the case for several decades.”

This dynamic shows how temporary alliances, often driven by immediate strategic or tactical interests, can quickly unravel. Overall, “there is, in fact, a resurgence of Sunni-Shia antagonism, even if, for a time, there may be a logic of opportunism that is not necessarily fundamentally ideological,” the researcher observes.

In sum, the relationship between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood remains a subtle game of paradoxes: neither a lasting alliance nor a total rupture, but a shifting balance shaped by history, geopolitics, and situational calculations. Syria, like other conflict zones in the Middle East, thus remains a space where political opportunism and doctrinal rivalries coexist, a reminder that temporary alliances between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood cannot permanently mask underlying structural divergences.