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3. Francophone Europe and the Muslim Brotherhood: Between Myth and Reality

While the presence of Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers in France and, more broadly, across Francophone Europe has long been established, the issue only entered mainstream public debate recently, following the publication of a government report on the Brotherhood’s influence in France last May. 

The report stirred widespread controversy, caught between political exploitation and perceived security concerns. It addressed issues extending beyond the Brotherhood itself, drawing links between political Islam and Salafism. Widely criticized, the document was described by some observers as a catch-all document —one that risks confusing a French public largely unfamiliar with the distinctions between these ideological currents.

Land of Sanctuary

Under increasing pressure and threats in their home countries, the Muslim Brotherhood sought refuge in France, Belgium, and Switzerland from the 1950s onward, as in other European countries. The goal was primarily one of survival, both political and physical. 
On the ground, “individuals from the Muslim Brotherhood movement encountered immigrant populations of Muslim culture, mainly from the Maghreb, who were not very religious,” explains Franck Frégosi, CNRS research director and author of Governing Islam in France (Seuil, January 2025), speaking to This is Beirut.

“Initially, these populations intended to return to their countries of origin and had not invested heavily in religious life,” notes Frégosi. “But the implementation of family reunification policies in the 1970s and 1980s changed the situation, as did the emergence of new generations born locally.”

“Thanks to the presence of students socialized in the Muslim world, who came to France in the 1970s and 1980s to pursue university studies, groups close to the Muslim Brotherhood sought to promote their version of Islam to local Muslim communities, supporting the emerging process of structuring Islam through the creation of associations, prayer halls, and religious courses,” explains Frégosi.

France: The Impact of the UOIF 

The Muslim Brotherhood became active in France through both associative networks and engagement with the state institutions. Indian scholar Mohamed Hamidullah, a political refugee in France and close to the Brotherhood, founded the Association of Islamic Students in France in 1963. Two decades later, in 1983, two Brotherhood members established the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), which was renamed the Union of Islamic Organizations of France in 1989. This federation brought together several regional Muslim organizations, such as the Association of Muslims of the Alpes-Maritimes (AMAM).

According to the recent report on the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in France, their strategy “relies on an Islamism adapted to the Western context, promoting an Islamic identity without direct confrontation.” The report also notes that the Muslim Brotherhood uses rhetoric around Islamophobia to challenge secularism and regularly practices a “double discourse” tailored to different audiences.

In practice, the UOIF sought to operate within a legal framework and gain recognition from French authorities. It remained engaged in dialogue, whether to advance issues paramount to the organization—such as the case of the veiled schoolgirls in Creil in 1989—or to enhance its legitimacy and credibility. Its messaging was adapted to the French context, addressing the veil, the fight against Islamophobia, and solidarity with Muslims worldwide, including in Palestine and among the Uyghurs.

In 1993, following a series of attacks in France, the UOIF publicly distanced itself from the Muslim Brotherhood and sought to soften its image by partnering with initiatives from the Ministry of the Interior. In the 2000s, the organization joined the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), a body under the ministry’s authority tasked with representing Muslims before the state.

In 1992, the European Institute of Human Sciences (IESH) was founded near Château-Chinon under the initiative of the UOIF. Specializing in Muslim theology and the Arabic language, it seeks to train imams in France. At its first graduation ceremony in 1997, Youssef al-Qaradawi, a prominent spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, was among the guests. Today, five other institutes across Europe operate under the umbrella of the Union of European Institutes of Human Sciences, with the Château-Chinon site recognized as the founding institution.
Meanwhile, the UOIF expanded into education, opening five state-recognized schools, including Collège Averroès in Lille in 2003 and Collège Ibn Khaldoun in Marseille in 2004. In the early 2010s, the UOIF withdrew from the CFCM and rebranded as Musulmans de France to emphasize its separation from the Muslim Brotherhood.

According to the same report, Musulmans de France currently manages 139 affiliated places of worship, as well as 68 considered close to the federation, representing 7% of the recorded sites. In addition to state-affiliated schools, the movement reportedly operates around sixty private schools and 280 associations. The document also estimates that there are between 400 and 1,000 sworn members of the Muslim Brotherhood in France.

Switzerland: The Influence of the Ramadan Family

As repression against the Muslim Brotherhood raged in Egypt following the failed assassination attempt on Nasser, Said Ramadan, son-in-law of the Brotherhood’s founder Hassan al-Banna, settled in Switzerland in 1958.

Both a safe haven and a strategic location in Europe, the country proved ideal for Said Ramadan, who had founded the Brotherhood’s branch in Jerusalem. In 1961, he established the Islamic Center of Geneva, which became one of the first hubs for spreading the Brotherhood’s thought in Europe. Initially funded by the Brotherhood and by Saudi Prince Faisal, the center later operated through various private donations.

His sons, Tariq and Hani, carried on his legacy. Tariq joined the board of directors, while Hani succeeded his father as head of the center, each pursuing their own objectives. Like his brother Hani, Tariq Ramadan has consistently denied belonging to the movement. However, his doctoral thesis on the “reformist Salafis,” in which he groups al-Afghani, Abduh, Rida, Hassan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb, was met with controversy by his university, with some professors arguing that it endorsed the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

After completing his studies, he published around thirty works on Islam and positioned himself as a proponent of a European Islam. Through his numerous lectures and publications, he exerted significant influence in the 1990s and 2000s, particularly among young Muslims in France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. His strength lay in engaging in debates in these countries on citizenship, secularism, and identity, while maintaining an intellectual closeness to his Brotherhood heritage in a modernized form.

Throughout the 1990s, he was a frequent speaker at UOIF events in France and across Europe. He was accused of using a “double discourse”: one tailored to European audiences emphasizing integration and civic engagement, and another directed at Muslims, rooted in a literalist reading of the Quran. 

In 1994, he founded the association Muslims and Muslim Women of Switzerland (MMS). He also taught at Collège de Saussure and spent two years lecturing on Islam at the University of Fribourg.

In 2005, his popularity earned him an invitation to join a UK think tank on Islamic extremism, launched by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair. In 2011, he became head of the Center for Research on Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE), founded that same year in Qatar. However, his popularity and aura of untouchability started to wane. On several occasions, he was banned from entering several countries, most notably France after the 1995 attacks and the United States in 2004.

“Tariq Ramadan enjoyed historical legitimacy as one of Hassan al-Banna’s grandsons,” says Franck Frégosi. “He gained significant prominence by speaking as a European Muslim and consistently tried to remain independent from Islamic organizations in Europe, including the Muslim Brotherhood. However, his influence has greatly diminished due to his legal troubles.”

In 2017, he was accused by several women of rape and sexual harassment, dealing a serious blow to his public standing. In his defense, he cited consensual extramarital relationships, but most institutions that had worked with him distanced themselves. The trial is still ongoing in France, while he was convicted in Switzerland in 2024 for similar offenses.

Belgium: A Hub for the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

The Muslim Brotherhood gradually established a presence in Belgium from the 1980s onward, leveraging its organizational skills and active involvement in local associations. According to a 2022 Belgian intelligence report, it now counts more than 39 affiliated entities, including schools, mosques, charitable foundations, think tanks, and scouting groups.

Researcher Brigitte Maréchal notes that the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was instrumental in establishing a foothold in Belgium, leading to the founding of the al-Khalil Mosque in Molenbeek in 1985. Today the mosque is the largest in the country and hosts several schools as well as the Islamic Aid League. Its first imam was Mohamed Toujgani, a charismatic Moroccan preacher, played a central role in shaping its influence. Maréchal emphasizes, “His discourse reflects a neo-Salafist orientation, but is mainly defined by a firm alignment with the strong political tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Toujgani also served as president of the League of Imams of Belgium and played a key role in training and influencing a new generation of preachers in the country. However, the presence of numerous jihadist networks within the mosque prompted Belgian authorities to expel him in 2021, although he has since returned. Given the pronounced Salafist tone of his preaching, some researchers consider Toujgani to be more Salafist than truly aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.

According to the Belgian newspaper Le Vif, the Muslim Brotherhood oversees the Islamic Educational and Cultural Complex in Verviers, which manages the Assahaba Mosque, the largest in Wallonia. The center offers a wide range of activities, including Arabic classes, tutoring, training sessions, lectures, and sports programs.

At the European, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood has also extended with the creation of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) in 1989. Described by a 2005 investigation from the media outlet L’Express as the “parent organization” of the UOIF, it reportedly “draws its references from the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Composed largely of UOIF members, the FIOE has been based in Belgium since 2007, but also meets regularly in Istanbul. In 2020, it was rebranded the Council of European Muslims (CEM), with the stated aim of influencing European institutions to promote its values and vision.

In 1997, the organization founded the European Council for Fatwa and Research in Dublin, Ireland. Its president was Youssef al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian preacher and renowned spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1996 to 2013, he also hosted the highly popular program Al-Sharia wal-Hayat on Al Jazeera. The council aimed to harmonize Islamic jurisprudence and fatwas Muslims living in Europe. The council seems to be inactive today, with no public activities on its website since 2020.

In 1996, FOIE also launched the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), bringing together 32 associations from 22 European countries. According to the French report on the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence, FEMYSO participated in 2022 in the development of a communication campaign by the Council of Europe’s Advisory Council on Youth, which portrayed the hijab as a symbol of freedom.

Declining Influence

While the Muslim Brotherhood experienced significant growth during the early stages of their presence in French-speaking Europe, it have since entered a period of decline. “The movements that can be identified as heirs of the Muslim Brotherhood are currently losing momentum compared with other Islamic dynamics,” confirms Franck Frégosi.

“They have clearly shown pragmatism by finding ways to operate within Western secular laws and even partnering with public authorities. At the same time, their leadership has become more institutionalized and recognized, gradually distancing itself from a younger, more active base that is often skeptical of the authorities’ policies toward Islam,” he explains.

Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood has also faced competition from the rise of Salafism, which, notably through social media influencers, has managed to attract a younger Muslim audience. This trend is echoed in the French government’s report on the Brotherhood’s influence, which cites, among other things, the state-led termination of several schools’ association contracts and the steady decline in the Brotherhood’s membership in the country.

A reality that does little to explain the political weight given to this report, or the political exploitation that followed. “The political use of this report raises questions,” says Frégosi, “especially since there are often conflations between those called the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, or other groups, even though they operate under entirely different logics and do not adhere to the same literalism interpretation of Islam.”
An ambiguity acknowledged by the authors, who state that “the report deals more with highly militant local Islamism than with the Muslim Brotherhood as such.”

This raises a broader question about why the French government commissioned a report on the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement in clear decline, rather than focusing, for example, on the far more dynamic influence of Salafism.