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3. Hezbollah’s Resurgent Arsenal: Borders, Ports, and Clandestine Workshops

Warnings mount over Hezbollah’s rearmament. After years of focus on Iranian financial backing, Washington and Tel Aviv are increasingly concerned about how quickly Lebanon’s Shia movement is rebuilding its arsenal.

A Wall Street Journal investigation published Thursday found that Hezbollah, far from adhering to the November 2024 ceasefire with Israel, is quietly restoring its military strength through several channels: border crossings with Syria, specific Lebanese ports, and local weapons production.

Retired General Khaled Hamadeh, director of the Regional Forum for Consultation and Studies (RFSC), told This is Beirut that international media, including American, French, and Israeli outlets, have recently reported on Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its military and logistical capacities. He added that the issue has moved beyond press coverage. Senior Hezbollah figures, including MP Ali Fayad and deputy head of the group’s Political Council Mahmoud Qomati, have publicly stated that the movement has regained its strength and is ready for confrontation. Iranian officials have similarly suggested that Hezbollah now has the means to “shift the balance of power.”

These statements have reignited debate over the group’s supply networks. The key question remains: Where are the weapons coming from? Has Hezbollah preserved old infrastructure, or is it relying on new routes and methods to rebuild its stockpiles?

Border Crossings Remain Active

Officially, most smuggling routes from Syria to Lebanon were closed under a security plan led by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) support. In practice, several remain operational, particularly in the Qalamoun region and northern Beqaa, between Qusayr, Hermel, and Arsal, a military source familiar with the issue told This is Beirut. These rugged, hard-to-control areas have long served as Hezbollah’s logistical corridors.

Despite joint army and General Security operations and patrols, smuggling discreetly continues. Shipments often cross the border at night, hidden in civilian or agricultural convoys, according to a Lebanese security source.

Riad Kahwaji, a Dubai-based Middle East security and defense analyst and director of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), told This is Beirut that Hezbollah continues to transport weapons into Lebanon, primarily from depots it previously operated in Syria, using established smuggling networks and intermediaries. “Syrian authorities have intercepted several shipments, but there have been no official reports on the Lebanese side,” he noted.

Some of the weapons – including rockets, anti-tank missiles, and artillery shells – come from Syrian warehouses under Iranian supervision, while others pass through allied militias along the border, according to The Wall Street Journal. The network is reportedly coordinated from Baalbeck, Hezbollah’s historic stronghold, where stockpiles are stored before redistribution to southern Lebanon.

Lebanese Ports: Channels for Weapons Transfers

The US newspaper also highlights the role of certain Lebanese ports in transporting military equipment. While no direct evidence implicates port authorities, Western sources point to gaps in oversight at secondary terminals.

The Beirut port, still under reconstruction, and Tyre are reportedly occasionally used to bring in spare parts or dual-use logistical equipment. Tripoli, closer to the Syrian border and less monitored, is of particular concern to Western intelligence. Some shipments from Iran reportedly pass through Syrian ports like Tartous before being rerouted to Lebanon via small vessels, making customs tracking difficult.

“Maritime routes are a sensitive channel. High ship traffic and administrative gaps make detecting illicit shipments challenging,” said Hamadeh. Although UNIFIL can inspect some vessels, operational realities leave room for cargo to slip through.

Kahwaji notes that the situation has significantly changed. “With the fall of the Syrian regime, Hezbollah’s ability to import or move weapons has sharply declined. When it does succeed, it is usually small arms, like GRAD rockets or Kornet anti-tank missiles.”

A Growing Local Weapons Industry

A major component of Hezbollah’s rearmament is domestic weapons production. According to a US newspaper, the group has reportedly set up multiple maintenance and assembly workshops in Lebanon for rockets and drones. Often hidden in rural or industrial areas, these workshops repair and modify missiles from Syria or Iran, and assemble Katyusha rockets, GRAD missiles, and improvised drones.

These facilities are believed to be mainly active in the Beqaa and the Beirut southern suburb. “Local production represents a major component of Hezbollah’s rearmament,” said Hamadeh. “They have workshops capable of repairing, modifying, or producing short-range rockets, artillery shells, drone components, and guidance systems,” he adds.

Local production has grown due to logistical constraints imposed by Israeli strikes and border restrictions. By manufacturing or assembling its own weapons, Hezbollah reduces reliance on Iran while maintaining its deterrence capabilities.

Such operations require substantial financial and technical resources. Multiple Western reports indicate Iran continues to provide Hezbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars annually, a portion now dedicated to local weapons production and maintenance.

A Fragile Balance

For Lebanese authorities, the situation remains volatile. The November 2024 ceasefire, intended to begin Hezbollah’s gradual disarmament south of the Litani River, is under strain. Israel, which claims to have conducted more than a thousand strikes against the group’s positions over the past year, continues to issue warnings.

Thomas Barrack, US envoy to Lebanon and Syria, warned that “the problem is no longer Hezbollah’s disarmament but its rearmament,” adding that without tangible action, Israel could “unilaterally act.”

Beirut is trying to buy time. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun have pledged to strengthen security coordination, but the Lebanese army, underfunded and politically constrained, struggles to maintain control over territory dominated by Hezbollah.

With Israeli drones patrolling Lebanese airspace and tens of thousands of displaced residents yet to return to the South, the balance remains fragile.

According to researcher Randa Slim, cited by Wall Street Journal, Hezbollah “does not see itself as defeated” and is actively rebuilding its military capabilities, confident in Tehran’s support. Kahwaji adds that under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the November 2024 ceasefire, “Hezbollah is not supposed to introduce new weapons into Lebanon or retain existing ones. In theory, it should surrender its entire arsenal to the state, not just south of the Litani.” By continuing to manufacture, conceal, and smuggle weapons, stresses Kahwaji, “Hezbollah is violating both the Resolution and the ceasefire agreement.”

As reports confirm Hezbollah’s supply networks and local production capabilities, rearmament has become not only a regional security threat but also a crucial test of Lebanese state sovereignty.