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3. Seeking Regional Leaders with Sadat’s Vision

Clothes do not make the man – a saying that fits today’s leaders of Iran’s radical factions, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Tehran’s proxies in Iraq and Yemen. They issue routine inflammatory statements and adopt media stances that are often exaggerated, sometimes bordering on the absurd.

In response to the upheavals sweeping the region, they do not hesitate, in a hostile tone, to issue surreal threats against the United States, European countries, Israel, and even Gulf states. They may be trying to raise the stakes ahead of possible negotiations with Washington, but above all, they aim to project firmness and uncompromising resolve, while in reality exposing what could signal panic amid unfolding events.

This sense of panic is amplified by the growing isolation of hardliners within their own social circles. On the local stage, Hezbollah has virtually no allies left beyond Amal leader Nabih Berri, who, whenever possible, signals a certain distance from the course dictated by the mullahs in Tehran.

The near-isolation of radical factions is also evident within Iran itself. To underscore his differences with the Revolutionary Guards, President Masoud Pezeshkian recently stated that “internal divisions [in Tehran] pose a greater danger than the snapback mechanism,” triggered last week by the European troika – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – to revive United Nations sanctions imposed on Iran in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 due to its persistent refusal to limit its nuclear program.

These internal divisions in Iran grew sharper in August with the emergence of the “Reform Front,” a coalition of around thirty parties, organizations and leading figures that released a roadmap calling for sweeping reforms and a profound shift in the regime’s policies, particularly on the nuclear issue and on relations with the West and Gulf states. The movement is especially critical of the mullahs, saying, “For 22 years, they have engaged in tactical negotiations with the West solely to buy time, without ever addressing the underlying issues.”

President Pezeshkian’s defiant stance, the emergence of the “Reform Front” and popular uprisings in several Iranian cities have contributed to somewhat isolating the Revolutionary Guards, who, for now, remain in control thanks to the brutal repression of dissent. Still, the growing opposition in Iran and Lebanon, not to mention Iraq, against the Pasdaran and Hezbollah reflects a deeper divide in political thinking and behavior. One camp bases its approach on irrationality, ideology and a rigid posture determined to confront the West, while the other exhibits pragmatism and clear-eyed awareness of the strategic realities at play.

Such a divide between pragmatism and irrationality has long marked this part of the world. It was strikingly evident in 1993, when Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat committed decisively to the path of peace, while Israeli Prime Minister and Labor Party leader Yitzhak Rabin showed enough pragmatism and political courage to extend a hand to the PLO, which he had previously labeled a terrorist organization.

This dual leap forward gave full momentum to the 1993 Oslo process, which had been initiated on both sides by a small group of senior Palestinian and Israeli officials. The result was a historic peace agreement, which was ultimately undermined by the two de facto allies of the time: the Israeli right and Hamas, which today are locked in conflict in Gaza.

Long before Arafat and Rabin, late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took the historic step of traveling to Jerusalem in 1977 to address the Israeli Knesset directly, seeking to turn the page on the long-standing conflict with Israel. This move paved the way for the Israel-Egypt peace treaty signed in Washington in March 1979. At a press conference, Sadat explained the reasoning behind his initiative, demonstrating a remarkable degree of geopolitical pragmatism. He recalled that during the October 1973 war, he had sent a message to Syrian President Hafez Assad, explaining that he accepted a ceasefire with Israel because, in reality, he was effectively at war with the United States rather than with Israel. “The United States has been at war with me for ten days, and I am therefore not willing to risk the destruction of my people and my armed forces,” he told Assad.

To further underscore his pragmatism, President Sadat noted at the same press conference that he had visited the Soviet Union four times, in March and October 1971, and in February and April 1972. “Each time,” he explained, “Soviet leaders made it clear, without any ambiguity, that there was no question of challenging Israel’s borders.”

In light of these historical facts, one conclusion is unavoidable: given today’s technological, military and intelligence balance, the leaders of the radical wing of the mullahs’ regime, as well as the leadership of Hezbollah and Hamas, must finally acknowledge that the Arab peoples need clear-sighted leaders of the caliber of Sadat or Arafat. For more than 75 years, people across the Arab world have endured, often unnecessarily, the hardships of successive, futile wars that offered neither resolution nor hope, preventing them from aspiring to a normal, peaceful life.