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The startling decision by United States President Donald Trump to lift economic sanctions on Syria, coupled with the collapse of the Assad regime, could fundamentally reshape how the Syrian displaced population in Lebanon is managed – unless their permanent return to Syria remains excluded from the agreement being brokered among the key parties involved.

Context

This decision disrupts the regional balance of power. On May 13, while in Saudi Arabia, Trump announced the complete lifting of US sanctions on Syria, ending more than a decade of economic isolation imposed on Damascus. The move follows the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, toppled by a combination of popular dissent and the withdrawal of his last remaining international supporters.

In Lebanon, this geopolitical shift carries immediate and urgent implications: what will happen to the roughly 1.5 million displaced Syrians  currently living on its territory – an official figure, although experts estimate the number exceeds 2 million? What will become of the humanitarian aid mechanisms that support them? Will these programs continue, or will the new regional reality prompt a fundamental reassessment?

Is This the End of a Diplomatic Rationale?

For years, the stance upheld by numerous NGOs, United Nations agencies and Western diplomatic circles was unequivocal: as long as Syria remained under an authoritarian regime and subject to sanctions, the return of displaced persons was neither safe, dignified nor sustainable. This position served to justify the continuation of extensive aid programs, particularly in Lebanon.

Today, however, that rationale is unraveling. “There is no longer any justification – be it humanitarian, economic, political or legal – for keeping these populations in host countries, including Lebanon,” a source close to the dossier explains. “With the fall of the regime and the lifting of sanctions, the path to return is now both technically and politically open,” they insist.

The Driving Factors

First, the political and security “risk” has been removed – even though it was widely known that Syrians were regularly crossing between Damascus and Beirut during the war under Assad’s regime. These movements took place in plain view of the international community and local authorities, who, for years, deliberately chose to stay silent – for reasons that were widely understood.

These underlying motives also help explain the billions of euros channeled in recent years by major international humanitarian institutions – such as the European Commission – to “support Lebanon’s socio-economic stability.” At the time, Europe was increasingly alarmed by the rise in irregular migration, particularly from Lebanese shores, which it came to see as a growing threat. To avoid bearing that burden itself, the EU opted to shift it onto more “vulnerable” countries. In return for hosting Syrian refugees, the EU pledged “generosity” toward several states – including Turkey in 2016, and more recently Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritania through agreements signed in March 2024. A veiled form of inducement that proved highly effective – one that ultimately served European interests.

A few months later, in May 2024, EU President Ursula von der Leyen was relying on Lebanon’s “good cooperation” to stem irregular migration to Europe. That cooperation, naturally, came with a price tag: a €1 billion package was announced, including €736 million to address the Syrian crisis and €264 million to support Lebanon’s security forces, particularly in controlling its borders.

While these sums fall well short of actual needs – the annual cost of hosting Syria’s displaced population in Lebanon is estimated at $2 billion – they appear to have been sufficient to “placate” parts of the Lebanese political class.

Though this chapter may seem far removed, its effects remain very much in force. The May 2024 agreement between the EU and Lebanon sets aid disbursements to span three years, with the program not scheduled to end until 2027. This timeline effectively governs the continued presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

That is, unless the newly formed Lebanese government asserts its sovereignty – as pledged in its ministerial declaration – and enforces the rule of law, particularly laws affirming Lebanon as a transit country rather than a permanent host.

This refers to the 2003 memorandum of understanding between Lebanon’s General Security and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Beirut, which establishes that Lebanon is not a country of permanent asylum. Under this protocol, the UNHCR is responsible for relocating displaced persons to third countries within six months – renewable only once in exceptional cases.

This legal framework has been largely overlooked by both Lebanese authorities and the international community. In a previous interview with This is Beirut, a senior European Commission official acknowledged, “It’s true that Lebanon’s needs exceed the aid provided, but don’t forget that the country benefits economically from the presence of displaced Syrians, since the foreign currency we channel to Syrians stays within Lebanon.” He added, “Not to mention the labor they provide – many Lebanese tend to shy away from jobs that Syrians take on.” Such remarks are sure to unsettle the few who remain committed to the principle of sovereignty.

Lebanon at a Tipping Point

For Lebanon, grappling with its worst economic crisis in a century, the continued presence of displaced Syrians raises fears of reaching a demographic, economic and social tipping point. “Lebanese society has reached saturation,” warns a local political analyst. This concern is heightened by the fall of Assad’s regime and escalating communal tensions in Syria – particularly among the new armed forces of Ahmad al-Chareh, the Alawites and the Druze – as Lebanon faces new waves of displacement.

According to figures from Lebanon’s General Security Directorate, there are 2,080,000 Syrian nationals in the country – “more than half of Lebanon’s estimated resident population of under four million,” warns Samir Daher, the advisor to former Prime Minister Najib Mikati. He adds that this ratio continues to rise due to thousands of Syrian births recorded each year – 40,000 in 2023 compared to 65,000 Lebanese births – bringing the total number of Syrian births since the start of the migration wave to 280,000.

In addition to Syrians, “other foreign residents in Lebanon include 270,000 Palestinians and 250,000 Arab, African and Asian nationals employed as domestic workers, gas station attendants and cleaning staff,” he adds. Altogether, “6.5 million people live within Lebanon’s 10,452 km² territory, resulting in a population density of 620 inhabitants per km² – one of the highest in the world, only exceeded by Monaco, Singapore and Hong Kong.”

Some political leaders are already calling for a swift revision of refugee policies, while others more directly urge the UN to coordinate a supervised return plan to Syria.

How those most affected will respond is still uncertain. Many – especially those from devastated regions or who have faced persecution – remain cautious. The regime change in Syria does not erase deep trauma or lingering resentment. Yet for others, the lifting of sanctions offers a fragile but real prospect of return.

The coming months will be critical. One thing is clear: the status quo is no longer sustainable.