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3. The 'Improbable Nation' and the Dysfunctional State

The resumption of the reckless bombardment of Israeli territories from South Lebanon is a blatant violation of the internationally mandated truce stipulations and puts at stake the stability of Lebanon and its hypothetical national security. The tedious game of pinpointing the culprits is part of a hackneyed stratagem whose goal is to perpetuate the state of uncertainty, normalize arbitrariness and blame it on Israel. There is nothing new, and we cannot expect better at this stage, since the insolvency of the new government is foredoomed at the onset. The deliberate equivocations, the ideological blinders, the open challenge of Hezbollah and the pervasive divisiveness of the new executive and its lack of cohesiveness account for the state of volatility that prevails in the country. 

The weakness of the government, the disoriented presidency and the audacity of Hezbollah testify to the fractiousness of the political landscape and the inability of the state to rebuild its autonomy away from the mortgages set by it. These basic facts question the relevance of the government and its ability to manage the politics of transition, if ever. The inherent inconsistencies of its formation and skewed representation, the ideological and political differences and the absence of constitutional stipulations to prevent the self-induced paralysis of the executive power are the abiding features of the Taif regime. They have been imposed and instrumentalized by the regional power brokers throughout the last 35 years.                                                                                                                                

Whoever the militant group that launched the rockets is, the Lebanese government cannot shift the blame and shelter behind the usual rhetoric of externalization to justify its irresponsibility and systemic inabilities. This newly formed executive authority has come on the heels of a major geostrategic upheaval triggered by the Israeli counteroffensive throughout the Near East and the reshuffle of the political and strategic dynamics. The international mediation was at the origin of the truce that was meant to pave the way to a progressive stabilization, conditional upon the takeover of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, the unconditional disarmament of Hezbollah and the Palestinian camps and the dismantling of their vast networks of armed gangs throughout the Lebanese territories. 

Paradoxically enough, none of these stipulations were addressed openly by the cabinet mission statement, which sheltered behind vague political promises with no practical incidence. The reasons are obvious, since the prime minister and his coterie are not explicitly committed to achieving the required military mandates, nor have they decided to set a threshold between the two eras. The rationale behind this policy course is ideological, political and personal, since the triumvirate that controls the government hails from the Palestinian militancy which has set the seeds of Lebanon’s destruction since the mid-sixties. 

Otherwise, the political careers of these incumbents thrived on the back of Palestinian militancy to promote their fortunes. Aside from the ideological considerations, these profiles are not by any means ready to engage head-on Shiite militancy for personal reasons. The prudential reasons are not quite convincing, despite the overdue rejection by Nawaf Salam of the Hezbollah motto, “people, army, resistance.” The government tactic was supposed to outmaneuver the international mandates, work on accommodating the clashing agendas of Shiite power politics and the demoted notion of national sovereignty, and displace the epicenter of Lebanese politics away from the national civil credo and its consociational configuration.

 The latest security blunders are far from accidental. They reflect the fractured political landscape, the endemic crises of national legitimacy and the realities of a dysfunctional governance. The new head of state, Joseph Aoun, navigates the muddied waters of a failed state and fails to demonstrate his willingness to engage the international mandates and break away from the systemic entropies that have corroded Lebanon’s immunity and ability to rebuild its moral and political autonomy. This interlude is coming to its end, and Lebanon is most likely going to miss the rare opportunity that was offered to extract itself from the destructive dynamics of six decades of open-ended conflicts and failed statehood.

The intentional obstructionism of Hezbollah correlates with Iran’s determination to overcome the destruction of its operational platforms in the Near East and retrieve its political footholds. It's no coincidence that the battlefronts in Gaza, the interfaces between Lebanon and Syria and the Houthis' random violence have been reactivated. Iran considers that its ultimate chance to contain its faltering defenses is to incite civil wars, widen the radius of chaos and ethno-national conflicts and reduce the scope of diplomatic mediation and arbitrated conflict resolution. Nonetheless, Iran has lost control over the region and its nuisance capacity has dwindled. The counter-insurgencies are proliferating, and the international power politics are no longer swayed by the erstwhile Iranian imperialism. The last stage of this late episode might be the confrontation with Iran, not its proxies.