The recent escalation of tensions along the Syrian coastline raises critical questions. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), since March 6, nearly 973 civilians, predominantly Alawites, have been killed in Tartous and Latakia, located in western Syria, where this religious minority is concentrated. The global Alawite population is currently estimated at around 4 million, with the majority living in Syria, where they make up between 10 and 15% of the population. Smaller communities also reside in Lebanon and Turkey. But who are the Alawites? What are their beliefs and, most importantly, why have they been marginalized?
An Esoteric Branch of Islam
The Alawites trace their origins to a branch of Shi'ism that developed in the 9th century. The doctrine is believed to have been founded by Mohammad Ibn Noseïr al-Namiri (died in 884), a disciple of the 11th Shiite imam, Hassan al-Askari. According to Alawite tradition, Ibn Noseïr received a new spiritual revelation from the imam, which became the foundation of their belief system.
In the medieval period, the sect was often referred to derogatorily as the Noseïris (followers of Noseïr). The doctrine that originated in Mesopotamia spread to northern Syria in the 11th century, initially around Aleppo, and later to the coastal region of Latakia. This is where it took root and flourished, spreading among the local peasant populations.
Theologically, Alawism is distinguished by its esotericism and syncretism. While it is rooted in Shi'ism, it significantly diverges from traditional Shi'a beliefs. The Alawite doctrine is based on a mystical interpretation of the divine Trinity: it reveres a triad made up of Ali ibn Abi Talib (the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad) — exalted as the Divine Essence or Meaning — the Prophet Muhammad himself (seen as the Name, or the veil of Ali) and Salman the Persian (a companion of Muhammad, regarded as the Gate that provides access to the divine secret).
The Alawites believe that Ali is a manifestation of God who created Muhammad, who in turn created Salman. From this perspective, Muhammad played a secondary role, primarily tasked with spreading a simplified version of the religion to the masses, while the true faith remains accessible only to the initiated.
As a result of this belief, the Alawite religion is transmitted secretly and through hereditary lines, categorizing it as an esoteric religion, similar to Druzeism. Only men born to Alawite parents are eligible for initiation into the mysteries of the faith during adolescence, following a period of learning. Women, however, are exempt, being regarded as “naturally devout” according to tradition.
Historically speaking, the Alawite community has been highly secluded: conversions to Alawism are rare and difficult, and there is no organized missionary structure. Furthermore, their religious practices significantly deviate from mainstream Muslim orthodoxy. Alawites do not attend mosques and lack an established clergy (with no regular imams), while their rituals include elements drawn from Christianity (such as the celebration of Christmas and Easter, and the use of wine in certain rituals) as well as other traditions reflecting pre-Islamic influences.
Their interpretation of the Quran is allegorical and esoteric, leading to views considered heterodox by both Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Many Alawite doctrines—such as the deification of Ali and the belief in a divine Trinity—challenge the Islamic principle of tawhid (the oneness of God), resulting in the Alawites being labeled as heretics by the majority of Muslims.
The Exploitation of Fear
Historically confined to the mountains of Latakia and Tartous, the Alawites were long marginalized from political power. Under the Ottoman Empire, they faced both discrimination and persecution.
The French mandate (1920-1946) marked a turning point: they were integrated in significant numbers into the military and gradually gained influential positions. Their rise gained momentum after Syria's independence in 1946, culminating in 1970 with the rise to power of Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite.
His regime, followed by that of his son Bashar, relied heavily on a security and military elite that was predominantly Alawite, intensifying sectarian tensions. Aware of the vulnerability of his community, the former regime systematically appointed Alawites to key positions in the military, intelligence services and administration.
During the 2011 uprising, Bashar al-Assad's regime capitalized on fears of Sunni vengeance to rally the Alawite community. At the same time, it relied on the Shabiha (“ghosts”), Alawite militias linked to criminal networks, to violently suppress opposition. The Shabiha's involvement in sectarian massacres, such as the Houla massacre (2012) and the siege of Homs (2011-2014), further deepened the image of a regime perceived as predominantly Alawite.
The Shabiha have transformed into a powerful tool of terror. Their violence has exacerbated sectarian divides, further exposing the Alawite community to the threat of violent retaliation.
Now, as violence intensifies, one crucial question looms: Are the Alawites paying the price for being unwitting pawns in political manipulation? Caught between fear, survival and coerced loyalty, their future seems increasingly uncertain, trapped in a volatile equation beyond their control.
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