- 11:05
The main pieces are being put in place… A likely diplomatic showdown — or, if diplomacy fails, a military confrontation — between the Iranian axis and the Western camp is clearly taking shape, both in Lebanon and across the regional landscape.
Several clear signs of this looming standoff have surfaced in recent days amid an increasingly volatile global climate. The latest came late last week with what appears to be a Syrian “counter-revolution” attempt, seemingly orchestrated by the Pasdaran with logistical — and possibly even direct — support from Hezbollah, according to an official source in Damascus on Sunday.
Forced out by the new regime along the banks of the Barada, the Iranian axis is once again extending its reach in an attempt to reclaim some of the ground it has lost in the strategically vital space of Syria and Lebanon. The likely objective was to secure control over Syria’s predominantly Alawite coastline, establish a potential military supply route — possibly by sea — and restore direct links with Hezbollah at the Lebanese border.
This counteroffensive, reportedly planned with the help of former officers from the ousted Assad regime, reflects a newly assertive Iranian escalation. The first clear sign of this shift came in early March with the sidelining in Tehran of Mohammed Jawad Zarif, the Vice President for Strategic Affairs, who is seen as the figurehead of the pragmatic faction in Iran. Zarif, who has consistently advocated for engagement with the United States (his two sons hold American citizenship), has faced relentless opposition from the hardline faction of the regime.
Another sign of the current hardening stance of the Iranian mullahs: Hezbollah's continued refusal to hand over its military arsenal to the Lebanese state and its ongoing efforts to rearm and rebuild its militia infrastructure, in direct violation of three key UN Security Council resolutions — 1701, 1559 and 1680. Hezbollah's defiance can now be explained in the context of recent developments in Syria: the pro-Iranian group, undoubtedly, had been clinging to the hope of a renewed Iranian sphere of influence along the Syrian coastline.
This redeployment effort initiated by the Pasdaran must be viewed in the context of a highly strategic factor, central to Tehran's hegemonic ambitions: the development of its nuclear program. In a report released on February 8, the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that Iran’s uranium enrichment had reached a “dangerous level,” with the Islamic Republic significantly and "worryingly" increasing its stockpiles of uranium enriched to 60%, dangerously close to the 90% threshold required for the rapid production of a nuclear weapon.
President Donald Trump reaffirmed last week that “we cannot allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons,” and disclosed that he had sent a message to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, urging him to negotiate an agreement on the country’s nuclear program. The initiative was promptly rejected by the Iranian leader, who stated that Iran “will not accept American demands.” This prompted a sharp response from the White House, issuing a concise but significant remark: “There are two ways to deal with Iran — military action or an agreement.” Trump made it clear that the agreement would be on his terms, emphasizing that time is of the essence. “Something will happen with Iran very soon,” the president said, adding that “we are in the final hour” of addressing the Iranian issue. These brief statements convey an unmistakable ultimatum.
In this context, the forceful move against the new Syrian regime and Hezbollah’s resolute refusal to surrender its military arsenal likely reflect a significant Iranian preemptive strategy to regain lost ground ahead of a looming diplomatic or military confrontation with the United States and Israel. This is certainly plausible. However, one conclusion stands out at this moment: those who chose Syria’s coastline to plot and execute their insurgency against the Damascus government made a serious mistake. They completely disregarded the inevitable and bloody repercussions their actions would have on the Alawite minority. This was openly condemned just forty-eight hours ago by a senior figure within the Assad clan, following a recent fallout with the former president.
The haunting memories of half a century of dictatorship and brutal repression, carried out without mercy by the ousted regime, cannot be erased so easily. Is it truly possible that the masterminds behind the subversion never considered the possibility of a massive mobilization of the Sunni population, leading to vengeful and bloody outbursts? What, then, do the lives of dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of innocent and defenseless civilians mean to these architects of violence, in the face of the hegemonic ambitions of a theocratic power that knows no bounds to its sectarian expansionism?
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