- 09:50
The major developments of this weekend, starting with the now-legendary clash between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the American duo Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, have unsurprisingly reshuffled the global order, particularly in Europe.
The Old Continent, which had grown unaccustomed to wars on its territory for several decades, has been facing Moscow’s expansionist ambitions since 2022—and even since 2014. After unwavering support since 2022 under Joe Biden, the United States is changing course, much to the dismay of its European allies and to the applause of the Kremlin. As the idea of a sovereign and independent Ukraine seems to fade, European countries must prepare for what comes next. What should they do in the event of a Russian attack or expansion? Could they prevent and/or counter it?
Unus Pro Omnibus, Omnes Pro Uno?
A Russian attack against a European country should, in theory, trigger a response from other Western states, particularly if they are part of an alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, an attack on one of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania), all NATO members, would compel the alliance states, under Article 5 of its founding treaty, to “immediately take, individually and in agreement with the other parties, such action as they deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and ensure security in the North Atlantic region.”
Unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno—one for all and all for one. A principle of solidarity at the very heart of the transatlantic alliance, created in 1949 primarily to contain Soviet expansionism. As long as this principle remains intact and NATO’s 32 states—led by the United States—are ready to support an attacked member, the risk of a high-intensity conflict in Europe remains very low, if not nonexistent. On Thursday, Donald Trump affirmed his “support” for NATO’s Article 5 during a joint press conference with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Vladimir Putin’s Russia would launch a direct attack on a NATO member, knowing full well that the allies, with Trump at the forefront, would retaliate.
Brain Death 2.0 and the European Nuclear Umbrella
In November 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that NATO was in a state of “brain death” and lamented the “lack of strategic coordination” between Donald Trump’s United States and European nations.
In response to future German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who wished for Europe to be prepared “for the worst-case scenario”—namely, a NATO without American guarantees—Macron reignited the debate on European nuclear deterrence, suggesting a security framework based on Franco-British capabilities.
However, as the Franco-British partnership between Macron and Starmer appears to be faltering in recent days, nuclear deterrence—whether European or transatlantic—alone cannot protect the Old Continent, since the opposing side, Russia, also possesses nuclear weapons and in far greater numbers. Experts estimate that Russia has around 5,500 nuclear warheads, compared to 290 for France and 225 for the United Kingdom. Even if not all Russian warheads are operational, any Russian attack on the European continent would be unlikely to trigger a Franco-British nuclear response, as such retaliation would risk escalating into a full-scale nuclear exchange, rendering Europe uninhabitable for decades. In other words, mutually assured destruction.
A (Dis)United European Defense
A country's—or a coalition’s—ability to defend itself depends on several factors, including military and civilian capabilities, alliances and, most importantly, political will. In September 2024, Vladimir Putin decided to increase the Russian army’s personnel to 1.5 million soldiers, a number equivalent to what Europe could mobilize. Several European Union (EU) states have more than 150,000 active military personnel: Poland (216,000 troops), France (200,000), Germany (181,000) and Italy (165,000). Additionally, Spain has over 100,000 military personnel, and the United Kingdom—though no longer part of the EU—has more than 70,000 troops.
But does an equivalent number translate to equivalent strength? The question arises when considering whether a European coalition could effectively organize itself without NATO’s command structure, in contrast to a single-country military like Russia’s, which has a clear command hierarchy. Which country would lead the army of 27 EU member states, not to mention other nations like the UK or Finland, which might choose to join the war? Or would each state fight alone, prioritizing its national interests over European unity?
Although European armies conduct joint military exercises and operate side by side in various theaters, as long as Europe (and particularly the EU) has not established a clear and rapidly deployable command structure, it risks organizational chaos, given the current decision-making processes within EU institutions, where unanimity among the 27 member states is required.
An Industry That Falls Short
“If Europe wants to survive, it must arm itself.” – Donald Tusk, Polish Prime Minister, January 22, 2025
In terms of military budgets, the EU’s 27 member states have increased their defense spending since February 2022, reaching $457 billion in 2024—just $5 billion less than Russia, according to “The Military Balance 2025,” the annual report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a British think tank. This marks a 30% increase over three years, according to the EU Council, but it does not necessarily compensate for:
- The decades of military disarmament policies pursued by European nations, who relied on American security guarantees.
- The absence of a true European defense policy.
It is not just about manpower and battlefield tactics, but also about a shared vision for needs, interoperability between different armies and cost-sharing. According to various sources, less than 20% of European defense investments are pooled among member states. This means not only that European countries fail to leverage their collective purchasing power—unlike their successful joint procurement of COVID-19 vaccines—but also that each state invests according to its own needs, structures and equipment.
Furthermore, Europe’s arms industry has struggled to keep up with demand since 2022, both in terms of production speed and quality. More than 60%—or even 80% by some estimates—of European military procurements are made from American companies. A glaring example is Germany under Olaf Scholz purchasing American F-35 fighter jets, despite being part of the Eurofighter consortium, while its neighbor, France, produces the Rafale.
Europe’s dependence on the US and NATO over the past 75 years has weakened its collective military standing. Although the idea of a common European defense has been discussed multiple times since the 1950s, it has never been politically pursued—especially by the Franco-German tandem.
Will the drastic shifts in the global order finally push Europeans to see themselves not just as a common market, but as a community capable of defending itself without the aid of a superpower? Or will they wait until another European country is invaded before seriously considering it?
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