Hezbollah still considers itself victorious. On the day of Nasrallah’s funeral, the group is preparing for a massive public display to prove that it remains strong. However, it has yet to realize that this is no longer the case. It signed a humiliating ceasefire agreement that completely eliminates its weapons, both north and south of the Litani River. A president was elected without its consent. A government was formed without its consent. A ministerial statement was drafted without even mentioning the word "resistance" or granting it any legitimacy; instead, it affirmed the state’s monopoly on arms.
Hezbollah and its supporters are living in a state of denial, which is unsurprising. However, the Shiite community can no longer afford the luxury of waiting to come to terms with Hezbollah’s military and political defeat—a defeat that is dragging the community into ruin.
Hezbollah’s short-term achievements for the Shiite community can be easily understood. Historically marginalized and concentrated in underdeveloped areas—from the Bekaa Valley to the south—the Shiites endured occupation by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Israeli invasion, and the costs of the July War and subsequent conflicts with Israel. The people of southern Lebanon have rebuilt their homes three times over the past 40 years. Hezbollah immersed its community in ideology while also providing social, educational, and financial services. A series of crises helped sustain its popularity. Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to fill the power vacuum with its own hegemony, and Iran played a role in turning Hezbollah into a tool to weaken the Lebanese state.
Some Shiites then believed they had become the strongest sect, imagining they could leverage their demographic presence—despite not being the majority—or exploit the concept of the 'national pact'. They sought to impose their own rules, despite not being the only players in the state.
But Hezbollah’s military defeat has shattered the very foundation that had momentarily lifted the Shiite community from its marginalized status. Shiite citizens have historically felt distant from the state, burdened by the perception that the government had abandoned them and ignored their struggles. In the past, they were stereotypically seen as “port workers,” just as Maronites were once labeled as “mountain farmers.”
The Maronites, however, went on to shape the First Republic, while the Shiites seized the opportunity presented by the Third Republic to assert military power. The difference is that the Maronites understood that force alone was not enough in times of war and militias, so they invested in education, business, culture, and development. Hezbollah, on the other hand, failed to do the same.
It has no lasting legacy that can help integrate the Shiite working class into a vital role within the country. Political appointments have no real value, and the role that the Shiites should have played in the state never materialized. Many Shiites have broken away from Hezbollah’s ideology through education but found no opportunities in Lebanon. They either emigrated or remained sidelined, overshadowed by Hezbollah’s armed dominance. With Hezbollah’s defeat, the influence of arms has faded. However, the Shiite community has yet to find an alternative foundation on which to build its future, as Hezbollah controlled them through force. When it lost its power, it lost everything.
Now is the time for the Shiites to carve out a place for themselves in the state, and there are many roles available. The current moment is ripe for them to engage in productive, cultural, and scientific fields. They belong to an enlightened community capable of transforming its role from a temporary military one into a lasting national presence.
Hezbollah has set the Shiites back by 40 years, but the opportunity to recover that lost time remains—if they choose to take it. And they do, in fact, want to. But that transformation must begin today.
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