Hezbollah and its allies persistently deny the narrative that it uses its weapons domestically and tailors its political actions solely to serve its interests and safeguard its arsenal.
Since entering the political arena in 2005, Hezbollah has maintained this stance, justifying its actions as efforts to safeguard Lebanon rather than addressing accusations of integrating its weapons into politics.
In 2006, buoyed by the power of its weapons and the euphoria of its perceived victory in the July War—though Hezbollah's definition of victory at the time raised many questions—Lebanon entered an era defined by the dominance of arms. This was prominently reflected in the downtown sit-ins aimed at toppling Fouad Siniora's government, which Hezbollah deemed illegitimate following the resignation of Shiite ministers from the cabinet.
The full force of Hezbollah’s weaponry became evident on May 7, when it entered Beirut in response to a government decision concerning its telecommunications network. This display of force reshaped Lebanon's political framework through the Doha Agreement, binding the landscape to Hezbollah’s terms. Anyone who criticized the use of weapons in politics at that time was attacked, and at times even killed. Meanwhile, Michel Aoun, defending these actions, declared, "We put the train back on track." The train, the tracks, and everything in between were issues Lebanon could neither move past nor benefit from, as Hezbollah continued to impose its agenda in various regions and key political moments. Among these were the reversal of the prime minister’s nomination following the “black shirts” episode and the imposition of delays until its demands were met.
The prominence of Hezbollah’s weapons waned after the defeat of the September War and the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and other senior leaders. Subsequently, Lebanon saw a president elected without the backing of Hezbollah’s weapons, a prime minister appointed without its endorsement, and a government formed with choices that diverged from the interests of armed factions.
However, Hezbollah’s counter-revolution was neither directed at Israel nor confined to street protests. Following the ceasefire and the end of the sixty-day period, Hezbollah shed its narrative of victimhood and celebrated in Gemayzeh without apparent justification.
The farthest reach of Hezbollah's weapons was a convoy of cars waving its flags down a street in Ashrafieh—a deliberate act intended to provoke the locals and label them as allies of the occupier, as though their liberation itself were an affront. The issue here is neither the occupation, nor the liberation, nor even the choice of the parade’s location. The real problem lies in the fact that Hezbollah’s supporters perceive their victory as a triumph over the people of Gemayzeh, rather than a victory against Israel.
Comments