What Is Israel Doing in Syria?
An Israeli soldier takes up position in the Syrian town of Jubata al-Khashab, in the UN-controlled buffer zone in the annexed Golan Heights, on December 20, 2024. ©Bakr ALKASEM / AFP

Israel is intensifying its strikes in Syria and bolstering its presence there, aiming to weaken its adversaries, control strategic areas, and secure its borders. These measures, driven by a blend of security imperatives and geopolitical aspirations, are part of a broader regional strategy addressing Syria's instability and the threats posed by Iran and its allies.  

On the morning of Sunday, December 8, as the Syrian people had just rid themselves of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the Israeli military declared the Golan Heights a “closed military zone,” while reinforcing its military deployment there.

A few hours later, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced from this territory, annexed by Israel in 1973, the end of the “disengagement” agreements signed the same year. These agreements aimed to locally end hostilities between Israel and the former Syrian regime by establishing a UN-controlled buffer zone.

Subsequently, Netanyahu ordered Israeli forces to “take control” of this area, while the Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched an intensive bombing campaign across Syrian territory previously controlled by Assad’s army.

Nearly two weeks later, Tel Aviv shows no sign of stepping back from its declarations. Its military now occupies more than 400 square kilometers along the border, including the buffer zone, while the IAF continues its airstrikes.

Protective Buffer

On December 18, the Qatari channel Al Jazeera reported over 600 Israeli strikes across Syria. This campaign aims to severely degrade the material capacities of Assad’s former army following its collapse in the face of rebel advances. According to the same source, nearly 80% of these capacities have been destroyed.

Planes, helicopters, air defense systems, and ammunition depots are all targeted to prevent the new Syrian government from acquiring the heavy equipment of the old regime. For Israeli leaders, the rebels, led by the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, are seen as no less dangerous than Iran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah. Tel Aviv considers Sunni Islamists just as threatening as their Shia rivals, whom they expelled from the country.

Speaking to AFP, Agnès Levallois from the Mediterranean and Middle East Research Institute (Iremmo) stated on December 9 that this posture “clearly sends a message to the new authorities in Damascus not to make any moves,” with the Israelis signaling that, despite the change in power, “they will not alter their strategy.”

Israel’s primary objective is to create a protective buffer along the border while eliminating the new government’s capacity to launch a military offensive.

Bargaining Chip

This buffer could also serve as a leverage in future negotiations with Damascus’ new rulers. These territories might become a bargaining chip, placing Israel in a strong position to demand a potential peace agreement.

This reflects the principle of “land for peace” established by the UN Security Council after the Six-Day War in 1967. The 1979 Camp David Accords between Tel Aviv and Cairo, which saw Israel withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt, remain the best example of this principle in action.

This position was reaffirmed by Netanyahu on December 18, when he declared that Israel would remain at Mount Hermon, the highest point on the Lebanon-Syria border, “until another arrangement is found to ensure Israel’s security.”

Strategic Positions

It is evident, however, that Tel Aviv’s operations extend beyond merely creating a protective buffer. Within the occupied territory, the Israeli military has taken control of two zones of strategic importance to its interests.

The first is Mount Hermon. Its elevated position — 2,814 meters above sea level — makes it an ideal observation post for Israeli forces to monitor not only movements of the new Syrian regime but also Hezbollah activities in Lebanon. This location is therefore valuable for potential future incursions against either of these actors.

The second strategic site under Israeli control is the Al-Wehda Dam, located on the Yarmouk River along the Syria-Jordan border. This river is a major tributary of the Jordan River, which irrigates the Jordan Valley, including its western side, shared between Israeli territory and the occupied West Bank.

Controlling this artificial reservoir allows Israel to “take hold” of part of the water resources in a region where they are particularly scarce. In addition to benefiting Israel with additional resources, the dam provides a bargaining tool against Damascus.

Southern Syria relies not only on the dam’s water, but also on the electricity it generates. Moreover, the dam offers leverage over Jordan, which depends on it for more than 70% of its water resources.

Targeting Iran

Beyond creating a buffer and controlling strategic areas, Israel pursues an additional objective in its confrontation with Iran. While the Islamic Republic, despite setbacks in the Levant, appears closer than ever to acquiring nuclear weapons, Tel Aviv threatens preemptive strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.

During the night of October 26-27, the IAF carried out a large-scale aerial operation against several key Iranian sites, weakening pro-Tehran forces’ defenses in Syria in the process. However, Israeli planes had to take precautions, flying at very low altitudes to evade Iran’s remaining detection systems for as long as possible.

With its bombardments having rendered Syria’s air defense system insignificant, the IAF can now operate with impunity over Syrian territory. Furthermore, the fall of the Assad regime deprives Tehran of an early warning system, thus reducing the time available for organizing its defenses.

This gives Israel a strategic advantage, as it can now easily reach northern Iraq — where airspace remains under US military control — to launch missiles against targets in Iran. This scenario could become even more likely with Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, given his stance on applying maximum pressure against Iran’s clerical regime.

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