Squaring the Circle

Political analysts are quite puzzled when they observe that negotiations in the Middle East are taking place between the US and the Iranian regime, which claims exclusive representation over the whole region. Twenty-two Arab states have no say over conflicts putting at stake their security, regional peace and international incidences. What is disturbing is the complacency towards the blatant usurpation of representation and the inability to challenge it. The Iranian axiomatic principle of negotiations is based on wresting power concessions versus surrogate conflicts, continuing instability and nuclear militarization.
In contrast, the Sunnite Arab core is trapped with the endemic crises of legitimacy, the enthralling yoke of geopolitical, ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflicts, the self-defeating contradictions of territorial statehood, the generalized state of civil wars, the emblematic nature of the Palestinian question and the inability to find working solutions through negotiations. The current mediators' difficulties are mainly due to their inability to define a common framework, to outweigh instrumentation and to generate consensus.
The unchallenged acceptance of Iran as the main interlocutor questions the possibility of functional negotiations, since it validates its spurious credentials and the premises of the “unified battlefields” instrumentalized in its destabilization strategy. It is no coincidence that the Arab partners are dubious (Qatar) and unsteady (Egypt) and pliable to Islamist political agendas and insidious power dynamics operating on both sides. We are practically left with the American mediator, whose strategy is predicated on situational constraints (liberation of Israeli hostages versus Palestinian prisoners, extended truce, humanitarian relief, etc.) and a serious attempt at jumpstarting the peace process at a time when the whole legacy of peace accords has plummeted. The Arab partnership is skewed, unrepresentative and ineffective whenever it comes to balancing the political agendas and exercising a real influence on the battlefields. One wonders whether the political tradeoffs considered are reliable indicators of stabilization and can really steer the region away from the hazards of regional wars.

The Gaza proposal is based on controversial premises whereby Israel should concede its security corridors (Netsarim and Philadelphia), Hamas retains some control over Gaza and the clocks should be reset before October 7, 2023. This kind of proposal is not only contradictory from a logical standpoint, but counterproductive since it is flatly rejected by Israel and inherently absurd after the massacres of October 7, 2023. The latest evolutions in the West Bank are quite indicative of a new geostrategic dynamic and a turning point in the life of this conflict. The current proposals may fall short of their promises since the military and political dynamics are changing at a breathtaking speed. Without an integrated approach whereby security, humanitarian and political variables coalesce, the State of Israel is unlikely to endorse the truce proposals. Unless the internationalization of Gaza’s governance, its demilitarization and the separation of the geostrategic stakes from the Iranian ordering agenda are practically enacted, the suggested modus operandi may turn awry and forestall the chances of the broader peace process.
Lebanon is ill-prepared to deal with the challenges of Hezbollah's subversion strategy piloted by the Iranian Islamic regime. It is highly divided over strategic security issues and unable to achieve a minimal consensus over questions impacting national security, international borders, UN peace monitoring and the implementation of international resolutions (Armistice Accord of 1949, UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1701, 1680, etc.). Lebanon is practically an extinct legal entity dominated by Iranian power politics (Debellatio). This state of political subjugation is a bad omen since it undermines the country’s international stature and ability to negotiate, in full-fledged partnership, future political arrangements. The current state of affairs is inadmissible since it ratifies the political death of Lebanon.
The truce proposals dictated by the dramatic humanitarian conditions and the destructive impact of the ongoing wars have failed, so far, to elicit the projected peace dynamics that should underwrite this whole undertaking. The Aristotelian “principle of non-contradiction” cannot glide over the antinomies of an aggressive Iranian imperialism, the imperatives of international law and the ruinous outcomes of its violation. The dividends of empirical diplomacy should never be overlooked; otherwise, correcting power imbalances and restoring strategic equilibriums is the inevitable road to be taken.
Comments
  • No comment yet