- 07
- July
- 2024
Editorial – Pezeshkian's Election: A Mere Facade?
modified on 19 Aug. 2024 à 09:26 Read : 4 minute(s) A A A
The election of the so-called “moderate” candidate Massoud Pezeshkian to the presidency of Iran on Friday is not a major surprise. The fact that his candidacy was approved this time by the central authorities, after being rejected in the 2021 presidential election, suggested that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, and the Revolutionary Guards (the Pasdaran) had a vested interest in including a “moderate” candidate in the presidential race, perhaps even facilitating his election. The 2021 election had been limited to candidates affiliated with the radical conservative faction, and back then, no one had questioned the electoral process.
Pezeshkian’s election most likely indicates a deliberate intention by the Supreme Leader, and possibly the Pasdaran, for specific strategic purposes. Otherwise, they would have declared the victory of the ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili, disregarding the results, as they did in June 2009 when the reformist candidate Hossein Moussavi publicly claimed victory and denounced extensive electoral fraud that, he argued, facilitated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Given that the Islamic Republic falls short of being an ideal democracy, Pezeshkian's election is most likely the outcome of a deliberate calculation by the Supreme Leader.
In a dynamically changing regional and international context, and given the theocratic and deeply dictatorial nature of the mullahs' regime in Tehran, what role and impact could the new president have? What could be his actual scope for maneuvering? It is important to emphasize, once again, a fundamental aspect of the current Iranian system: significant strategic decisions and the Islamic Republic's policy direction lie exclusively within the purview of the Supreme Leader. The president's role is to administer state affairs strictly adhering to the (indisputable) directives set by the Guide, the Wali al-Faqih, whose legitimacy, as a descendant of the Prophet, is derived from divine authority rather than popular mandate.
Adding to this “divine” factor, which greatly restricts Pezeshkian's—and indeed, any president's—scope for action, is another crucial element: the current National Assembly is predominantly made up of radical ultra-conservative MPs. These legislators are likely to make the new president's life difficult by consistently curbing any potential “excesses” in relatively “liberal” policies, particularly concerning social issues and women's rights.
The process is both cunning and subtle: bringing to the forefront a personality whose profile can somewhat appease dissidents in high circles, while imposing strict safeguards on the chosen leader to keep the entire system in check. This maintains the illusion of democracy. Given these constraints, what is the significance of Pezeshkian's election? For the mullahs' regime, the immediate goal would be to first quell popular dissent and foster internal easing, thereby facilitating efforts to address the significant socio-economic and financial crises plaguing the country.
Will the new president manage to harness this apparent willingness to alleviate the severe repression experienced by youth, professionals, artists, intellectuals, and particularly young girls and women who face arrests, torture and lashings over minor infractions like a strand of hair escaping from the mandatory Islamic veil—an issue that has inflicted great hardship on Iranian girls? Will Pezeshkian manage to curb, if not halt, the death sentences for “corruption on earth” and the rampant executions carried out pitilessly? This will be one of the main challenges that the new president and his government will have to tackle, within the limits of what is possible and what the real custodian of power will tolerate.
Another goal likely set by the Supreme Leader in favoring the election of a moderate president would be to prevent a direct political confrontation with the United States and the West in the current context, especially with the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House. One of Pezeshkian's campaign slogans was precisely to initiate a policy of openness towards the Western camp. The stakes are high in this regard: showing goodwill to secure the lifting of the severe sanctions imposed on the mullahs' regime.
However, this doesn't imply a radical change in behavior from the Islamic Republic. It's unlikely that the Revolutionary Guards would relinquish their strategy of exporting the Revolution or their expansionist, destabilizing policies that have plunged four Arab countries into chaos in service of Iranian state interests... Unless international decision-makers, current or future, finally realize that the time has come to offer the mullahs' regime, especially the Revolutionary Guards, solutions they cannot refuse… Today, more than ever, the stability of not only the Middle East but also the broader free world hangs in the balance. Addressing the overlapping crises that fuel extremism worldwide requires establishing a new, balanced and sustainable regional order that should be imposed on the radicals in Tehran. Anything less is mere weakness, and ultimately just a facade.
Comments