On Monday, Sleiman Frangieh, former MP and Minister, paid a visit to the Chief of the Army, General Joseph Aoun, offering heartfelt condolences on the passing of the General's mother.
During the evening, Frangieh, accompanied by his wife, Rima, and his son, MP Tony Frangieh, was welcomed to a dinner hosted by the former leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Walid Jumblatt, at his residence in Clemenceau. Two meetings with a notably social emphasis, as unanimously affirmed within the circles of both Frangieh and Jumblatt. The Clemenceau dinner is a manifestation of the openness policy embraced by both parties, and the restoration of “historical and familial” relations between the Marada and the PSP stands as one of its components, as shared by MP Wael Abou Faour with This is Beirut.
Nonetheless, the rapprochement between the two is indissociable from the current political context, which remains at a standstill due to the ongoing deadlock in the presidential process and the Gaza war.
Bou Faour anticipated that this matter will be on the agenda of the upcoming Cabinet meeting, especially considering the existing agreement in principle on the subject.
According to a source closely connected with Clemenceau, the dinner included discussions about the presidential dossier. Despite the broad nature of the conversations, it was underscored that the PSP maintained a firm stance on the imperative need for consensus to resolve the current deadlock. The conversation delved into the Gaza war and focused on the appointments within the Military Council, particularly the selection of a new Chief of Staff. As for Abou Faour, this issue is set to be addressed in the upcoming Cabinet meeting, especially with the existence of a principled agreement on the matter.
According to credible sources within the opposition, there is a unanimous sentiment that, in a similar vein, the Clemenceau meeting should not be given an undue or exaggerated importance, and the PSP’s stance on the presidency has not undergone any changes.
Although expressing a preference for an agreement, the party led by Taymour Jumblatt, currently aligns itself with the opposition politics. The party officially endorses the candidacy of former minister Jihad Azour for the presidency, in contrast to Sleiman Frangieh, the candidate backed by the Amal-Hezbollah tandem.
For quite some time, there have been recurring information suggesting a possible resolution to the presidential deadlock, motivated by potential negotiations for a settlement in Gaza and southern Lebanon. In Lebanon, they underscore the need for a reconstitution of power dynamics that primarily goes through the election of a President of the Republic.
Within the local political context, however, there has been no change, except maybe for Hezbollah's willingness maybe “to investing in the opening of the southern front with Israel to secure significant political gains.” This means the presidency of the Republic, as analyzed within opposition sources while stopping, somewhat surprised, at a recent statement from the Speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, who reaffirmed the Amal-Hezbollah tandem's endorsement of Sleiman Frangieh's candidacy, thereby once again obstructing the path to a breakthrough.
However, as the distribution of political forces within the Parliament remains unchanged, the accession of the latter to Baabda remains impossible. As for the same sources, “the opposition will not fall into the trap of those who believe they can impose their own rules,” while attempting to take advantage of the explosive situation on the southern border with Israel.
The dynamic in which the PSP is engaged, marked by its openness to various parties – with Taymour Jumblatt's upcoming visit to the leader of the Democratic Party, Talal Arslan, on Wednesday – serves in particular to shed light on the centrist role he aspires to persistently assume. Simultaneously, Marada's leader, Sleiman Frangieh, is motivated by the willingness to prove that he remains in the presidential race, as a candidate “close to all political parties.”
However, this falls significantly short of clearing the path to Baabda for two primary reasons: the distribution of forces within Parliament, which also obstructs the opposition's ability to bring its candidate to the helm of the State, and Hezbollah's involvement in the Gaza war through the opening of the southern front with Israel.
According to the analysis conducted by a prominent figure in the opposition, Hezbollah was in a stronger position before October 7, 2023– the date of the Hamas attack on Israel. This was a period when the US was actively engaging in negotiations with Iran, culminating in an agreement on the delineation of maritime borders with Tel Aviv. However, the operation on October 7 and the “unity of fronts” within the obstructionist axis (called al-Moumanaa) against Israel significantly weakened the pro-Iranian formation. Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has practically expressed a readiness for negotiations toward a resolution while endeavoring to impose his conditions, by claiming the cessation of combats in Gaza, in the first place.
Despite Hassan Nasrallah's vocal proclamations of victory, the stark reality, according to the opposition, paints him as a loser in this war. Firstly, since October 8, when he initiated attacks on Israel in solidarity with Hamas, he has shown the limits of his military engagement, constraints that neither he nor Iran seem willing to transcend. Moreover, Nasrallah has contributed to imposing new stakes that worked against his interests. This is evident in Israel's foremost priority today, which revolves around distancing Hezbollah from its border and ensuring the long-term security of the kibbutzim in the northern part of its territory. The diplomatic endeavors, with Lebanon at their core, are aimed at achieving this specific objective.
According to the same source, failing to neutralize Hezbollah, Israel, and by extension, the US, will strive to reduce its power. This includes preventing individuals closely affiliated with the party from attaining the position of Head of State. Unless, of course, the pro-Iranian formation provides assurances or makes concessions on specific dossiers…
During the evening, Frangieh, accompanied by his wife, Rima, and his son, MP Tony Frangieh, was welcomed to a dinner hosted by the former leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Walid Jumblatt, at his residence in Clemenceau. Two meetings with a notably social emphasis, as unanimously affirmed within the circles of both Frangieh and Jumblatt. The Clemenceau dinner is a manifestation of the openness policy embraced by both parties, and the restoration of “historical and familial” relations between the Marada and the PSP stands as one of its components, as shared by MP Wael Abou Faour with This is Beirut.
Nonetheless, the rapprochement between the two is indissociable from the current political context, which remains at a standstill due to the ongoing deadlock in the presidential process and the Gaza war.
Bou Faour anticipated that this matter will be on the agenda of the upcoming Cabinet meeting, especially considering the existing agreement in principle on the subject.
According to a source closely connected with Clemenceau, the dinner included discussions about the presidential dossier. Despite the broad nature of the conversations, it was underscored that the PSP maintained a firm stance on the imperative need for consensus to resolve the current deadlock. The conversation delved into the Gaza war and focused on the appointments within the Military Council, particularly the selection of a new Chief of Staff. As for Abou Faour, this issue is set to be addressed in the upcoming Cabinet meeting, especially with the existence of a principled agreement on the matter.
According to credible sources within the opposition, there is a unanimous sentiment that, in a similar vein, the Clemenceau meeting should not be given an undue or exaggerated importance, and the PSP’s stance on the presidency has not undergone any changes.
Although expressing a preference for an agreement, the party led by Taymour Jumblatt, currently aligns itself with the opposition politics. The party officially endorses the candidacy of former minister Jihad Azour for the presidency, in contrast to Sleiman Frangieh, the candidate backed by the Amal-Hezbollah tandem.
For quite some time, there have been recurring information suggesting a possible resolution to the presidential deadlock, motivated by potential negotiations for a settlement in Gaza and southern Lebanon. In Lebanon, they underscore the need for a reconstitution of power dynamics that primarily goes through the election of a President of the Republic.
Within the local political context, however, there has been no change, except maybe for Hezbollah's willingness maybe “to investing in the opening of the southern front with Israel to secure significant political gains.” This means the presidency of the Republic, as analyzed within opposition sources while stopping, somewhat surprised, at a recent statement from the Speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, who reaffirmed the Amal-Hezbollah tandem's endorsement of Sleiman Frangieh's candidacy, thereby once again obstructing the path to a breakthrough.
However, as the distribution of political forces within the Parliament remains unchanged, the accession of the latter to Baabda remains impossible. As for the same sources, “the opposition will not fall into the trap of those who believe they can impose their own rules,” while attempting to take advantage of the explosive situation on the southern border with Israel.
The dynamic in which the PSP is engaged, marked by its openness to various parties – with Taymour Jumblatt's upcoming visit to the leader of the Democratic Party, Talal Arslan, on Wednesday – serves in particular to shed light on the centrist role he aspires to persistently assume. Simultaneously, Marada's leader, Sleiman Frangieh, is motivated by the willingness to prove that he remains in the presidential race, as a candidate “close to all political parties.”
However, this falls significantly short of clearing the path to Baabda for two primary reasons: the distribution of forces within Parliament, which also obstructs the opposition's ability to bring its candidate to the helm of the State, and Hezbollah's involvement in the Gaza war through the opening of the southern front with Israel.
According to the analysis conducted by a prominent figure in the opposition, Hezbollah was in a stronger position before October 7, 2023– the date of the Hamas attack on Israel. This was a period when the US was actively engaging in negotiations with Iran, culminating in an agreement on the delineation of maritime borders with Tel Aviv. However, the operation on October 7 and the “unity of fronts” within the obstructionist axis (called al-Moumanaa) against Israel significantly weakened the pro-Iranian formation. Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has practically expressed a readiness for negotiations toward a resolution while endeavoring to impose his conditions, by claiming the cessation of combats in Gaza, in the first place.
Despite Hassan Nasrallah's vocal proclamations of victory, the stark reality, according to the opposition, paints him as a loser in this war. Firstly, since October 8, when he initiated attacks on Israel in solidarity with Hamas, he has shown the limits of his military engagement, constraints that neither he nor Iran seem willing to transcend. Moreover, Nasrallah has contributed to imposing new stakes that worked against his interests. This is evident in Israel's foremost priority today, which revolves around distancing Hezbollah from its border and ensuring the long-term security of the kibbutzim in the northern part of its territory. The diplomatic endeavors, with Lebanon at their core, are aimed at achieving this specific objective.
According to the same source, failing to neutralize Hezbollah, Israel, and by extension, the US, will strive to reduce its power. This includes preventing individuals closely affiliated with the party from attaining the position of Head of State. Unless, of course, the pro-Iranian formation provides assurances or makes concessions on specific dossiers…
This Is Beirut
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