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From the launching of the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel in October 2020 to the agreement finalized on October 27, 2022, an extensive negotiation process unfolded. The initial phase witnessed active participation from the Lebanese delegation, carefully chosen by the former President of the Republic. Was it all a futility?
According to Michel Ghazal, an international expert in negotiation and conflict management who advised the military-technical delegation in drafting and executing its negotiation strategy, the agreement reached on October 27, unfortunately, falls short of the “historic breakthrough proclaimed by the Lebanese participants.”
Michel Ghazal, the founder of the European Center for Negotiation and President of the Ghazal Foundation for Education, Research and Peace in Lebanon, is a renowned author in the field of negotiation. He provided invaluable counsel to the Lebanese delegation in crafting and implementing their negotiation strategy.
In his recent publication, Occasion manquée? Les Secrets des négociations maritimes Liban-Israël (Missed Opportunity? The Secrets of Lebanon-Israel Maritime Negotiations), released in October, Ghazal provides a comprehensive historical document. He elucidates on why and how the Lebanese political leaders, entrusted with the issue, failed to seize an opportunity to secure all that Lebanon rightfully deserved. He attributes the failure of a major diplomatic victory not only to the “lack of needed political support from the Lebanese authorities” but also to interventions that sought to undermine the arguments of the Lebanese team, sometimes akin to deliberate sabotage.
This Is Beirut spoke to Michel Ghazal.
Why is it considered a “missed opportunity”?
Several indicators support this evidence. To highlight just two, it’s clear that, according to this agreement, Lebanon has granted Israel a veto right regarding the exploitation of the Qana field. The agreement does not specify that all of Qana belongs to Lebanon. The agreement solely specifies the right for Israel to conduct drilling and exploration throughout the entire field. However, under the terms of the agreement, after completing the exploration work, if the Israelis fail to reach an agreement with TotalEnergies concerning their shares, they have the power, for as long as they deem fit, to obstruct any exploitation of this gas field.
Furthermore, when delineating borders, it is expected to encounter cross-border fields, such as the Qana field in Block 9, along with Blocks 8 and 10. This situation can potentially spark conflicts over the distribution of revenues generated by these fields. However, the agreement does not explicitly detail an arbitration procedure with clear timelines for resolving foreseeable conflicts, leaving open the possibility of encountering an exploitation deadlock similar to the one experienced by Cyprus with Israel over one of its fields. The agreement only specifies that in case of a disagreement, the mediator’s role falls exclusively on the United States.
Why did the negotiation strategy adopted by the Lebanese delegation fail to achieve the anticipated outcomes?
It’s essential to highlight that throughout its term, the Lebanese delegation vigorously advocated for the defense of Lebanon’s legitimate interests—preventing the exploitation of its maritime resources and asserting its sovereignty. As such, the delegation formulated a clear strategy, emphasizing that Lebanon needed to amend Decree 6433 submitted to the United Nations in 2011, in order to bolster its negotiating position. With this amendment, the arbitrary Line 23, unsupported by any recognized technical or legal method in maritime law, would be replaced by Line 29. The latter is based on sound arguments and is more favorable for Lebanon. Furthermore, the Lebanese government had commissioned the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) to conduct a scientific study for the southern maritime delimitation of the country. The UKHO recommended two options. The first would provide Lebanon with an additional 300 km² beyond Line 23, while the second, more precise and later designated as Line 29, outlines a boundary that grants Lebanon over 1,400 km². However, this study was filed away by certain officials at that time and was only brought to light in 2019 by the Lebanese army. A more serious fact pertains to the following: it was disclosed that in 2009, Israel drew Line 23 to demarcate its northern blocks, namely Alon F and Alon D. Is this a mere coincidence? Given that the finalized agreement fails to adequately address several of the country’s interests, or at least does so only partially, why was this strategy dismissed? Below are the nine concerns expressed by political authorities and the corresponding responses from the team.
What is the current status of the exploration activities in Block 9?
Many theories circulated in Lebanon following the halt of drilling in Block 9 by TotalEnergies. The Transocean Barents platform which adheres to a meticulously planned schedule established months in advance, concluded its exploration at the designated depth. When the discovered gas quantity was deemed commercially unviable, the exploration platform proceeded to Cyprus, as per its planned itinerary. It’s essential to point out that for each drilling operation, TotalEnergies invests significant amounts, approximately 120 to 130 million dollars, and the company has a reputation to uphold. The initial exploratory phase is essential for gathering valuable information. In a subsequent phase, which may span several months, this data is used for an in-depth. In turn, the latter will be shared with the Lebanese government and will help pinpoint the most promising potential drilling locations within Block 9. As an example, in the Mediterranean, some fields have required up to nine drillings before locating a viable well.
What interest do the United States and Israel have in Lebanon’s discovery of gas reserves in Block 9?
The United States, a key player in this agreement, has a paramount interest in regional security and stability. They believe that if Lebanon uncovers oil and gas, it will undoubtedly strive to safeguard these resources, prompting efforts to quell any warlike intentions from certain parties.
The Israelis also stand to benefit if Lebanon discovers gas, as they hold a portion of the Qana field in Block 9. It’s crucial to note that everything beneath Line 23 belongs to Israel. Therefore, in the event of gas discovery in this field, the Israelis will receive their share, estimated at approximately 16%.
According to your perspective, what are the implications of this agreement for Lebanon’s future negotiations?
A crucial aspect of any negotiation is to refrain from establishing a precedent. To achieve this, the southern delimitation needed to be based on maritime law. However, Line 23 is an arbitrary demarcation line that does not comply with internationally accepted legal criteria.
As Lebanon is inevitably headed towards negotiations for its northern borders with Syria and western borders with Cyprus, Syria could argue the following: If Lebanon has not applied international law with a “hostile” nation, why would it be willing to do so with Damascus, deemed as a “brotherly nation”? This agreement can hence establish a detrimental precedent for negotiations with Syria. One has to bear in mind that the aforementioned country has already delineated a line intruding upon 750 to 1000 km² of Lebanon’s northern exclusive economic zone.
How can this “misstep” be rectified?
According to some constitutional experts, there is only one option. They argue that this agreement has a legal loophole as it contradicts Article 52 of the Lebanese Constitution. Contrary to the claims already made, the document has indeed been registered with the United Nations as an international treaty and not merely as a simple agreement. Nevertheless, according to Article 44 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in the presence of a recognized legal loophole, it is possible to challenge and question the said treaty. While it’s highly unlikely, a new Lebanese government could take such action. Yet, as I emphasize in my book, the Lebanese cling to hope amid their countless challenges. I support any solution that provides a way out of this dark tunnel into which the Lebanese have been plunged due to the incompetence of their leaders.
